IS WAR DIMINISHING?

A STUDY OF THE PREVALENCE OF WAR IN EUROPE FROM 1450 TO THE PRESENT DAY

BY

FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS, M.D.

AND

ALEXANDER BALTZLY

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BY

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PREFACE

THIS volume represents the completion of a collection of dates of war that I began in a more or less rough way some six years ago. Starting with the history of England, France, Spain, and Russia, I was soon greatly struck by the failure of the modern centuries to give much diminution in the proportion of time devoted to the horrible art of war. As far as these nations were concerned, it seemed that there was no diminution of war worth speaking about. I was surprised to find that in the earlier as in the later periods, man seemed to have fought about half of the time, and not, as is often erroneously said, almost continuously in the early stages of history. I did not believe that a natural and psychological phenomenon which had persisted so constantly could suddenly cease; and indeed these dates that I had collected influenced my whole attitude on the great questions of internationalism *versus* nationalism, and pacifism *versus* preparedness.

Publication was delayed by other interests, but in October, 1913, Mr. Baltzly, on his appointment as Adams Woods Fellow in the Department of Government in Harvard Uni-

versity, took over the material which I had collected, and, besides verifying or correcting the dates in a thorough way, was able to add material from the histories of a number of smaller nations in Europe. These smaller nations, and likewise Austria and Prussia, all showed a decline in the amount of war. Still, I am not certain that there is good proof that warfare is tending to disappear with the advance of the ages.

Mr. Baltzly's work was begun with no theory in mind; to quote his own words, "neither a romantic delight in war, nor holding a brief for the peace societies." It was something of a question in our own minds, and also in the minds of historians with whom we talked, whether one could always decide just whether a nation was at war or not, and just when a war began and when it ended. Mr. Baltzly used his own judgment as to what to include as technically a war. Other judgments would necessarily differ, but it is not likely that they would do so except to a minor extent, and they would certainly not affect the conclusions. As for the conclusions that are here drawn I am myself largely responsible, as I am entirely for the introductory chapter. The dates of the wars as they stand at present are entirely the work of Mr. Baltzly, who is also responsible in part

for the descriptive text. In counting up the years of war for each half-century we have avoided the confusion and difficulty of knowing just the month a war began or ended, by simply taking the first year and the last year as if they were always one half of a year. Also all the wars that began and ended in the same year would on the average be about six months long, and have so been taken.

It is hardly to be expected that these dates will forever stand without further correction, but until something better is brought out it is believed that this publication, aside from its contribution to the science of quantitative historical interpretation (historiometry), will serve as a handy book of reference to historians.

FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS

BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS
August, 1915

AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

STATISTICS of the dates of war must needs be gathered in a great variety of works; some of these are chronological, some are narrative. I will note those most often consulted in this research.

The most useful encyclopædic guide in the domain of war is the ninth volume of a *Handbuch für Heer und Flotte*, by G. von Alten and H. von Albert (Berlin, Leipzig, Wien, and Stuttgart, 1912). It is part of a large work, still in process of completion, which aims to give in dictionary form an "Encyklopädie der Kriegswissenschaften." The ninth volume is, however, complete in itself and covers the field in considerable detail, especially for the things German. Its weakness appears to be a meagerness in the field of English history.

The *Cambridge Modern History* affords aid in this direction. Other general books have been useful, such as Richard Lodge's *Close of the Middle Ages*, which is better for chronological detail, perhaps, than for any other purpose. For the nineteenth century nothing is more valuable than the *Epitome of Universal History* of Carl Ploetz, enlarged and corrected in the last American edition by William H. Tillinghast (Boston and New York, 1909). For the eighteenth century, also, considerable reliance may be placed on Ploetz; for the Middle Ages and earlier modern period, except in German history, Ploetz is not reliable in any matter that demands accuracy. The *Annual Register* is valuable so far as it covers the field, that is, from the mid-eighteenth century onward.

No great difficulty exists, however, for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Certainty may be

approximated since 1700 in almost all cases. The greatest troubles are met with in the fifteenth century and those immediately succeeding, especially in Eastern Europe.

For Austria-Hungary the two special histories used were: Alfonso Huber, *Geschichte Oesterreichs* (Gotha, 1885–1896, 5 vols.), a work which extends only as far as 1648, and Louis Leger, *Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie, depuis les origines jusqu'à l'année 1889* (third edition, Paris, 1889).

For Denmark: Carl Ferdinand Allen's Danish history in French translation, *Histoire de Danemark* (Copenhague, 1878, 2 vols.), and Nesbit Bain's *History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, 1513–1900* (Cambridge, 1905).

For England: Samuel Rawson Gardiner's *Student's History of England*, which is arranged in capital style for chronological purposes.

Little difficulty exists for France since the appearance of the admirable collaborative work, edited by Ernest Lavisse, *Histoire de France* (Paris, 1904).

For Holland: Petrus Johannes Blok's *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche volk* (Groningen, 1892–1908, 8 vols.), which appears in English translation by Oscar A. Biersaadt and Ruth Putnam (New York and London, 1898–1912, 3 vols.), is an excellent work.

The figures for Prussia are not difficult to get, although Herbert Tuttle's *History of Prussia* (Boston, 1884–1896, 4 vols.) is not an adequate work in every way. M. Waddington was able to carry his *Histoire de Prusse* through the first volume only. Droyssen's *Geschichte des Preussischen Politik* (Berlin, 1855–1886, 5 vols.) is one of the best authorities for this purpose.

Great difficulties attended the compilation for Russia, for which Karamsin's *Istoria gosudarstva rossiiskavo* (St. Petersburg, 1880–1889, 12 vols. in 6) is good

as far as it goes, i. e., to 1613. Sergius Solevev's *Istoria Rossii* (19 vols. in 9, 1857–1869) is good for the rest of the seventeenth century and until 1732. Alfred Rambaud's *Histoire de la Russie* (Paris, 1900, fifth edition) has many inaccuracies, but is useful.

No very admirable general history of Spain exists; the nearest approach, perhaps, is the rather ill-arranged work now in progress by Rafael Altamira y Crevea, *Historia de España y de la civilizacion española*, completed as far as the early nineteenth century in four volumes (Barcelona, 1900–1911).

For Sweden, in addition to Bain's work, referred to under Denmark, are F. F. Carlson's *History of Sweden*, translated in German (Gotha, 1855) as *Geschichte Schwedens*, a continuation of Erik Gustav Geijer's *Svenska folkets historia* (Stokholm, 1876, 3 vols.), translated in English by J. H. Turner (London, 1845).

No work referred to is more satisfactory, in some ways, than the recent *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (5 vols., Gotha, 1908–1913) of Professor Neculai Jörga, of Bucharest. For chronological purposes Jörga's work is somewhat difficult to use, but its thoroughness cannot be doubted.

In connection with one of the many questions that come up as corollaries of this statistical report, a little book of charts, by Otto Berndt, entitled *Die Zahl im Kriege*, may be mentioned. It shows in graphic form the relative sizes of the nineteenth-century armies in European wars.

A. Baltzly.

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IS WAR DIMINISHING?

I

INTRODUCTORY

WITHIN the last twenty years hundreds and hundreds of books and pamphlets have been published on the subject of war and peace; but these have been almost without exception from the emotional, personal, and subjective point of view. It is strange that among the host of well-meaning pacifists and in the phalanx of sturdy militarists, where the assumption is rife that war is to cease or ought to cease, no one apparently has taken the pains to find out if war really *is* ceasing. No one has made appeal to the simplest facts of history bearing on the philosophy of war, namely, the dates of wars, — the definite actual years of peace and of war that have accompanied the lives of successive generations of men. Are the periods of war declining and the periods of peace increasing? Can we conclude from a broad survey of history that the forces of evolution have tended to make warfare of less and less importance as the centuries have rolled on? May we not raise the question, — Is not war likely to be

more important rather than less as time goes on?

War, like any natural phenomenon, has a space as well as a time element. Wars may be less frequent than formerly, yet they may be greater in magnitude, involving larger proportions of the total population. They may be more bitterly fought and subject to less interruption than in the olden times; and also the suffering may be greater even in spite of advancing knowledge and skill in the care of the wounded. The present war makes us quite willing to believe the most pessimistic assertions, whereas a few years ago a very large proportion of well-informed people would have scouted the idea that war was to be as important a factor in the future of man as it had been in the past. That is because the majority of people who study history do not learn anything from it. They read here and there as their fancy directs. They are as likely to have a false impression as a true one.

The more they read, perhaps, the worse off they are, since they are sure to remember just that portion of history that will bend further their already warped judgment. Men who are effective as writers, speakers, or political leaders are bound to have their theories, prejudices, and convictions. Generally the more powerful they are the more

hidebound are their beliefs and the more dogmatic their assertions. They must speak *ex cathedra*. The public does not wish for proofs, it merely wishes to hear well expressed those ideas that happen to be in vogue in its own sect, caste, nation, or party. All this is inevitable and natural, yet it ought to be fully realized that these gifted guides of public opinion may do a great deal of harm. They do not seek the truth. They injure the progress of truth. They waste time in fruitless discussion. They distract the world's attention from the true and only fountain source of information which is and always must be *research*.

It was with a wholesome disgust at the unscientific character of the publications of various peace societies that I began to collect these few humble facts. And why should there be *several* peace societies one might ask. Is there to be such a thing as human rivalry even here? Perhaps the pacifists have been hard enough hit by the present manifestations of reality against theory, but when one re-reads the publications of some of these societies, printed before the present war, and sees the way that persons who pride themselves on having the superior moral point of view openly disregard the truth, one is not very sympathetic if they suffer somewhat.

Peace advocates start with the assumption that their convictions are the only true moral principles. They see a future civilization in which uniformity and helpfulness shall take the place of rivalry and brute force. The militarists reply (as a matter of fact most military people do not reply at all because they are largely men who do things rather than men who discuss things), — militarist philosophers, we might say, of the Teutonic type reply, that success in modern war is essentially intellectual, a matter of brain and eye, not of leg and biceps, of organization and leadership, of discipline, control, and self-sacrifice. In a word, it is the farthest removed from the brutal, in the sense of being animal or low, in the scale of organic evolution; a nation at war is the most highly complex organic aggregate that we know anything about. Man has arrived in control of nature because he is a fighting animal and more than the other animals he fought his way forward by reason of his brain. All the leading races of the world are descended from the conquerors of the world. The progressive whites of Western Europe and Northern America are essentially conquerors. The Japanese, the only progressive people in Asia, are essentially conquerors. The world's future progress will depend on what kind of

people control its surface and dominate its activities. Here, then, is the true altar for the highest moral sacrifice — devotion to the great complex aggregate to which you by nature belong; work and duty, with hope and indeed conviction that your nation and race is to survive and play its part in the future. What larger ideal does man really know than this? What evidence has Nature ever given that she wants *all* races to survive? Everything indicates that some races sink. Do you wish it to be yours? Do you wish to have your children subject to a race whose ideals seem repugnant compared to your own? Each according to his own, as he sees the right, must fight for the right as he sees it. There can be no higher glory.

It is not with a wish to place the moral standard of the militarists above that of the pacifists that I give their point of view. I do not even attempt to show that there is just as much to be said on this side as on the other. I do not pretend to know anything of moral questions, and am not much interested in them at present except to raise this protest. As a man of science I should like meekly to ask these professors of ethics, law, and justice, these presidents of colleges, these moral educators, if morality is not necessarily bound up with truth.

The pacifists have a right, I take it, to start with a subjective assumption based on their own inner feelings, but they certainly have no right to pervert the facts by ignoring or denying all unwelcome truths.

The type of ideal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is shown in one of the publications of the American Association for International Conciliation written by a prominent member of their Executive Committee and also trustee of the Carnegie Endowment.[1]

"The cynic smiles; and well he may. Human nature is not to be made over in a day, or in a year, or in a century. But the man who is clear-sighted enough to perceive and to understand the everlasting force of a moral principle will not cease to work for its accomplishment because the time of that accomplishment is in the far distance. Moreover, there are many things within the range of practical international politics that can be begun at once and done speedily."

"All this philosophy of civilization was presupposed by the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment when they began their work. They perceived that the minds of men must be convinced that morality is a higher prin-

[1] Publication No. 75, February, 1914, by Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, pages 4–5.

ciple than brute force, and that it must be proved to the satisfaction of public opinion that the balance of individual, social, and political gain is on the side of peace and international friendship."

In other words, no matter whether the balance of social and political gain is on the side of peace or on the side of successful war, we shall pretend that it is on the side of peace. The writer goes on in the following words: "To accomplish these ends elaborate and prolonged studies, highly scientific in character, must be made and their results published to the world." A little further down the page he says: "It will not be long before the publication of the results of these scientific undertakings will begin, and it may safely be predicted, not only that the volumes containing them will constitute an indispensable library for the publicist, but also that they will contain material which, in the hands of skilled and experienced propagandists, can be made to count heavily in the enlightenment of public opinion everywhere."

Again the "cynic smiles," but this time at what constitutes in the minds of some people a *highly scientific* method. But the cynic will certainly agree that it may be predicted that the volumes will be used by the propagandists. Such, then, is a frank confession

of the way one prominent pacifist regards the problem.

In another pamphlet called "The Dawn of World Peace," William Howard Taft states: "The battlefield as a place of settlement of disputes is gradually yielding to arbitral courts of justice. The interests of the great masses are not being sacrificed, as in former times, to the selfishness, ambitions, and aggrandizement of sovereigns, or to the intrigues of statesmen unwilling to surrender their scepter of power. Religious wars happily are specters of a mediæval or ancient past, and the Christian Church is laboring valiantly to fulfill its destiny of 'Peace on earth.'"

Professor Edward L. Thorndike writing from the psychologist's standpoint, in 1911,[1] and apparently influenced by an essay of William James's on this same subject, shows how deluded a man who usually bases his statements on quantitative research may become when he launches into the flowery domain of the philosophy of history. Professor Thorndike ignores the important fact that we cannot yet dogmatize as to the causes of war. He seems to assume that armed conflict arises from something in the minds of the common people, some natural longing for

[1] *The Emotional Price of Peace*, American Association for International Conciliation, No. 45, August, 1911.

excitement and adventure, that has to be satisfied somehow and might be vicariously satisfied in some other form of daring. He takes no cognizance of the uniform and willing peacefulness of men during periods of peace, until they have been inspired to go forth to war. It would seem that in 1911 Professor Thorndike did not expect that there would be much more war. He writes as follows: "We are all learning that a righteous cause is a cause for war only when the wrong done by the war is less than the right it preserves. Nor will there be in the future any such readiness as there has been in the past to assume that the war which some one is interested in stirring up is really in the defense of national welfare." He takes no account of the actual grouping of mankind into more or less definite units under more or less centralized control from the top, or if he does he assumes that this in the future is to disappear, whereas in fact, perhaps, it is to increase. Who knows?

The superficial and subjective interpretation of history, the complete misunderstanding as to war's causation, is well shown in Pamphlet No. 70 of the same International Conciliation Association. This was written in September, 1913. As this author[1] has ex-

[1] Randolph S. Bourne.

pressed most of the commonplace pacifist ideas, "world is a unit," "interdependence of the nations," "delicacy of international credit," etc., a full quotation of the last paragraphs from this publication will serve as an expression of some of the theories of this sect. It must be conceded that the predictions have not been fulfilled: —

"With the unification of Germany and the freeing of the Balkan States, the center of gravity of international politics shifted from Europe to the conflicting spheres of interest in Asia and Africa. A long period seems now about to ensue of adjustment of power and influence, accompanied by inevitable boundary and trade and colonial disputes. It will all be accomplished with a fraction of the bloodshed and labor that was wasted on the similar process in Europe. The Hague Court provides the machinery for the settling of the legal questions involved; the political questions will be settled by diplomatic negotiation and international conferences and commissions. Slowly we may expect, as an international public opinion is formed, to see a body of criminal international law developed, and the most crucial questions of international interests resolved by arbitration. Meanwhile none of the media can be neglected. The peaceful settlement of interna-

tional disputes, based on rivalries of *prestige*, must be the supreme aim of the Peace Movement."

"Such a peaceful settlement is being furthered by the recognition that is rapidly permeating the minds of the Western peoples that the world is a unit. The wits of diplomats are being sharpened by the discovery that war does not pay. International conference and negotiation has become an actual economic necessity. The enormous development of industrial technique during the last century, the utilization of natural resources, combined with the existence of a flood of capital ready to flow to any part of the earth that needs it in its economic development, have produced an economic interweaving and interdependence of the nations that is without parallel in history. Capital knows no country; by foreign investment nations are knit together in bonds which defy all irrational prejudices and sudden or age-long jealousies. There is an international system of credit so delicate that a shock at any point means calamity to the entire fabric. The successful conquest of one nation by another would simply mean the destruction of the financial prosperity of the conqueror. Even the conquest of an undeveloped country like Tripoli hardly redounds to the prosperity of

Italy, for the latter will depend upon foreign capital for the development of the resources, and the riches of Tripoli will drain away to the profit of the financially capable nations."

"The idea is also seeping down through the racial consciousness of the Western peoples that war is physically suicidal as well as economically unprofitable. War eliminates not the unfit, as its admirers so fondly claim, but the fittest and best. Europe is weaker, not stronger, for the men she has lost in war. This country is mentally and morally feebler for the slaughter of her finest manhood in the Civil War. The very perfection of armaments and the terrific drain of cost is already making warfare almost impossible. The nations are now on the verge of bankruptcy, and actually do not dare to fight."

"These are the economic and psychological forces that are driving physical aggression and coercion from the field of international relations, and bringing diplomacy and arbitration to the front, not as supplements, but as actual substitutes for war. The various institutions which we have considered above are becoming the institutional expression of a world-consciousness analogous to the consciousness of ethnic or national unity. A real feeling of 'internationality' is being born. While we have been hoping, the nations have

become linked in an interweaving of interests so powerful that the successful functioning of each part depends upon the prosperity of every other part. World-wide arbitration or world-federation will be but the recognition of the fact that war is world-suicide. Nations will fight only when the world has lost all its hope and all its sanity."

Another publication called "The Phases of Progress towards Peace," [1] by President S. C. Mitchell, of the University of South Carolina, dwells much on the optimistic side of the case. He writes as if selfish national interests hardly existed. "The world has shrunk to the dimensions of a township, all men are neighbors." This writer has a good deal to say about the value of neutralization, and agreements to delimit war. Thus Belgium is among the specially favored nations.

"Just as the benefits of freedom presented in the Northwest a permanent contrast to slavery, so any sphere of civilization dedicated to peace will serve as a standing argument against the senselessness of seeking to determine questions of international justice by vast military establishments for organized murder. In fact, the neutralization of such countries as Belgium and Switzerland are a

[1] Publication No. 12 of the Maryland Peace Society, November, 1912, page 6.

present application to war of the very principle of geographical delimitation which proved effective in dealing with slavery. Delimitation of war, by curtailing the category of questions which may give rise to war on the part of such signally conspicuous nations as England, France, and America, would amount to a demonstration of the effectiveness of reason over brute force in the attainment of justice that must prove irresistible to mankind."

All this written a few years ago reads sadly enough just how. Not only have we been told that in this commercial age the great banking interests controlled the question of peace and war, but we have also been assured that the great force of International Socialism would render impossible a world-wide conflict. The socialists claimed to total ten or twelve million votes and thirty million or more adherents. Judging from their talk at International Congresses there seemed little likelihood that the great bodies of socialist workmen could be easily induced to take up war; but no people were quicker to fly to arms than these same socialists. Their protest was practically *nil.* Instead of holding together in united brotherhood each faction is now calling the other traitor. The socialists like the pacifists were in complete misunderstanding

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as to the psychology of war and the position of war as a phenomenon in human evolution. They completely misjudged the primordial instincts and falsely prophesied through lack of fundamental knowledge either biological or historical.

The activities of the militarists a few years ago in England and in France are now gratefully accepted by all classes. It is not probable that many are wishing that they had been less well prepared. Discussion has given place to action. There is no time at present for anything else; but after this war is over (or seemingly over) there will be a great deal of discussion about the question of permanent peace. When that time arrives it is to be hoped that the present cataclysm will have shown the theorists how tremendously complicated the problem is, and that they will treat the question with more humble regard. The criticisms that I have brought forward have been made not with the idea of useless ridicule, but to illustrate the complexity of the problem, and the need of honest systematic research.

Much that is one-sided might also be found in writings of the extreme militarists. There is one idea in particular, often quoted either *by* them or brought up against them, that is now in poor repute, — that is the contention that

armies "preserve the peace," or are "for the purpose of preserving the peace." The advocates of universal peace naturally say "the present war has absolutely disproved the contention that strong militarism will preserve the peace." The militarists ought never to have said that an army was to preserve the peace. If they had spoken frankly, they would have said that the function of an army is to win in war. This idea, during times of peace being repugnant to the popular mind, it has always been thought the proper thing for each nation to speak of its own army as an army of *defense*. Since at any time in history some nations are growing and gaining in strength and others are becoming less strong, it is impossible that all armies should be armies of defense. All armies that are relatively growing are potentially, presumably, armies of conquest. When the trial comes they may or may not meet the test. Since wars usually cannot come out exactly even, either these armies of potential conquest become armies of real conquest, or else if they are beaten some other army is proved to have been indeed an army of potential conquest.

One does not need to multiply instances to show how confused and gratuitous are most of the utterances upon the philosophy of war. If one were studying the philosophy of vice

it would not be thought unfitting to admit that the problem was a hard one, that human frailty and passion had existed since time immemorial, that human nature had changed but little if at all, that a phenomenon that had been in existence for thousands of years would probably show itself to some extent one hundred or two hundred years hence. What, then, is the reason that well-meaning and intelligent people are not prepared to take the same attitude about war, — or to accept the view that war is likely to exist in some form and to some extent one or two hundred years hence?

Probably the difference lies in this, — one is a constant phenomenon while the other is intermittent. Vice is to some extent always present and is constantly brought to our attention by the daily press. War, on the other hand, occurs with long interruptions, so that whole generations of men may live and die without ever experiencing it. Furthermore all emotional and bodily feelings, passions and instinctive responses, are very difficult to conjure up when they are not actually felt. Just think, even, how difficult it is in the cold of winter to conceive that we shall ever again suffer from extreme heat, or *vice versa*, on a frightfully hot day in summer to imagine Arctic cold. Under ordinary condi-

tions it is questionable if any one can imagine the agonies of thirst suffered by a man lost in the desert. A nation at war is in a different instinctive and emotional state from a nation at peace. It has responded to instincts not called forth in times of peace, tribal and gregarious instincts always potentially present in all groups of men but lying dormant until required. The war instinct is probably a different thing from the fighting instinct. These instincts may have had a related beginning far back in early organic evolution, but they now seem distinct, both in their origin and their utility.

The fighting instinct in the true sense of the word is not useful, in fact it would go very badly with a man who had the fighting instinct. If a man goes around fighting everybody he does not last long. In the Far West, just before the Vigilante days, there was just one moment, so to speak, in the world's history when the real fighting man prospered. Some of those early desperadoes, like Boone, Helm and Henry Plummer, lasted a long time. They killed many a good man, but sooner or later the Vigilantes "got" them all; the law-abiding element grew and the outlaw element declined; and soon the early days in the Far West became a closed chapter, and a chapter that we can now see was unique. I think it is

safe to say that there never was before in the whole written history of the world any time like that in the early West, when a man could walk about killing people, and keep it up. Such a social order, or rather disorder, shows us by its own qualities how wonderfully free from fighting and killing ordinary daily human intercourse is. Let us picture to our minds the life in the early cities of antiquity, — Thebes, Babylon, and Tyre, and the smaller communities as well. We can conceive of these people quarreling much, but not of a man single-handed holding up the town. Nor can we suppose that there was much killing within any one town or city; not indiscriminate killing right and left by individuals; only organized killing by groups and factions. The most primitive and savage society shows the same thing; there is much killing of one tribe by its neighbor tribe, but a man who killed within his own tribe would certainly become unpopular. In days of old in sparsely settled regions the highwayman flourished; but that is exactly my point, that it is the *group formation* of men that necessitates the life of peaceful citizenship. The natures that have not been willing to adapt themselves to the environment of groups have been weeded out. The quarrelsome types have tended to disappear. Throughout all the ages, and for

about half the time, groups have fought against other groups. That is the reason why the war instinct, in contradistinction to the fighting instinct, has taken a different course. There has been little if any natural selection tending to eliminate the war instinct. It has been useful for obvious reasons.

No natural groups of men could have been evolved without the gregarious warring instinct, since the groups that were relatively deficient in the qualities that hold men together would be just the ones that would as a group crumble away. Hence some groups must from time to time be growing and strengthening themselves at the expense of others. Some survived groups are always present, and may be regarded as living entities endeavoring to preserve their form. They are to a certain extent natural, to a certain extent artificial. That is to say, they in part depend on racial similarities, but also to a great extent on political accidents changing with the oft-shifting outline of the political frontiers. These groups should never be thought of as absolutely definite entities with clearly cut outlines, — not like animal species; but rather should be thought of as varieties and sub-varieties with vague geographical boundaries and more or less of a tendency to hold together as a unit. They are

much more liable than are animal varieties to sudden splittings and rearrangements, so that the history of European warfare presents, in the ever-changing alliances, a kaleidoscopic picture.

The natural enemies of any group are its nearest surrounding groups, but some of these may be, for the time being, its friends and allies; it all depends on the exigencies of the political situation.

The result of it all is that to-day, or at any day up to the present, practically every young or middle-aged man is ready to respond to the call for arms when the gregarious fighting instinct is stimulated. It is essentially a gregarious instinct; therefore, only after many persons are already affected is its full force felt. That is also why, in the initiative stages of the ebullition, the action of a comparatively small number of persons counts for so much, if they in any way exercise a practical control or leadership. The instinct is there, simply because it is an instinct, and therefore like all instincts inherited in the germ-plasm of the race. It matters not whether a man's immediate ancestors did or did not actually take part in warfare. The reason why it makes no difference is because acquired traits are not inherited: that is, if they are acquired from the environment,

acquired from education or practice. Biologists are in almost universal accord on this point. Therefore, as is often the case in the history of man, one whole generation of a race lives through maturity and dies never experiencing war, but the war instinct is not the least lessened thereby.

If these human problems are to be treated scientifically, they must be tested in the objective spirit of inquiry. The first need in science, at least in inductive science, is to collect the facts. We must first collect all possible facts about war. Next we must analyze and classify these facts. This will lead to some understanding as to (*a*) causes of war; (*b*) results of war. Among the causes of war we may provisionally postulate racial, economic, religious, and personal causes. Among the results we must try to weigh not only the evils, but also the possible benefits, the intellectual and moral as well as the political and economic effects, the aftermaths of war and their relations to industrial, commercial, literary, and artistic activity. In weighing all these results of war, distinctions must be made between successful and unsuccessful war, for it is highly improbable that the effects can be the same on the nations that win as on the nations that lose.

Then, again, the interests of certain portions of the nation are not identical with the interests of the nation as a whole. For instance, a successful war waged in a foreign country may not benefit the rank and file among the conquerors, but the officers and the families of the officers and the governing classes in general may as a caste profit much in the extension of wealth and power.

Another obscure question — one that has been much discussed and but little studied — is the relationship of war to eugenics. What is the selective survival of war and its influence on the race and on the evolution of mankind? This selection must have its good side as well as its bad. The evils are obvious and have been much exploited. "The removal by war of the strongest and the leaving at home of the weakest to propagate the race is bound to have as result a physical deterioration of the population concerned." On the other hand, critics have contended that the great mortality in war is really of advantage to the race, because, within the army itself, those who can survive hardship and disease must be by nature stronger than those who succumb.

Also in modern warfare cunning and resourcefulness count for a great deal. It seems highly probable that more than ever before superiority in intelligence is a great asset

among fighting men. The way this works out in relation to survival of the fittest is curiously interesting. It must be admitted that among all the millions who to-day are firing at each other either shells or bullets, the men who are the most accurate with gun or rifle are, other things equal, doing the most killing. Other things are, of course, not equal. Success depends on various factors, — amount of ammunition, rapidity of transport, good leadership, etc., etc., — but the fact remains that in spite of it all the best shots are killing more people than the poor shots are. Then it follows that the best shots are themselves less often killed than are the poor shots, after any interval of time. To make this clear it is perhaps necessary to imagine an extreme instance. Suppose two opposed trenches contain one hundred men each. Let one trench be supposed to be filled with extraordinarily good shots, the other with extremely poor ones. Then, after an interval of time nearly all the men in the trench of poor shots would have been hit while only a very few among the good shots would have been hit. The same principle holds, no matter how the men are distributed, that the best shots will be themselves least often struck. It does not occur to the individual soldier to think of his chances of survival through the war being en-

hanced by the fact that he is a good shot. That is because so many other factors enter in that mean more to him personally. It makes a great difference to his chances personally where he happens to be sent. He may very likely be killed by shrapnel or by a bayonet. But on the average for all the soldiers on both sides this factor counts toward the selection for survival of a certain kind of superiority. It is highly improbable that superiority in handling modern weapons is not correlated with general mental superiority.

So it is with other forms of killing. If it be admitted that intelligence is a factor at all, then the more intelligent must themselves tend to escape from the mere fact that they tend to do more of the killing. If strength and intelligence are of any value in a bayonet charge, then just so far as they tend to the killing of opponents so they must tend to the survival of their possessors. With artillery, indirect fire, telephones, wireless, and modern machine guns, intelligence must count for a good deal in the successful destruction of the enemy. Then it counts that much toward the survival of those who do the destroying.

Another matter that is very often mentioned is the percentage of officers to men among the killed and wounded. Returns usually show a regrettable disproportion of

officers among the casualties. This is said to lower the average quality of the blood of the nation. It does, of course, lower the average, but it must be remembered that, as a question purely of the evolution of man, man has not evolved essentially by a raising of the average. It is the rise in the intelligence of a very small percentage of all mankind that has been the feature in the growth of civilization. It has always been the same in all organic evolution. The world to-day is farther advanced in evolution than it was in the Carboniferous Age, not because the average of all types of life is higher, but because *some* of the types are higher. Some may have sunk even lower in the scale of life. It is the same in the evolution of the mammals, and the appearance of man among the mammals. Great things have happened, not because all the mammals progressed, but because one out of a very great number progressed. If the officers constitute one per cent and the soldiers ninety-nine per cent, the officers might be reduced to three quarters of one per cent. There would be a loss in the average of the whole, but the three quarters that remained among the officers might by selection be superior on the average to the one per cent there at the start.[1]

[1] If anything does bring this about, and it is quite conceivable that a selection for superiority does take place, then warfare causes

In whatever light we may view all these difficult questions, the great fact remains that somehow man has evolved, and he has fought, presumably half of the time. If warfare is so deleterious it may be asked, — How did he get where he is? We have thus seen how difficult and complicated is the philosophy of war. Yet most writers have been content to take one side or the other of the issue, so that we have scarcely begun to have a science of the subject. With the hope that some day this tremendously important problem may be better understood, let us examine and discuss a few primary facts.

not a deterioration, but a *differentiation*. The officer caste tends to be smaller in proportion to the common soldier caste, but it tends to be biologically farther and farther removed from it and more and more above it. This is precisely what evolution is, — a constant making of greater and greater differences in races, varieties, and species. This is also just what has taken place in Europe for hundreds of years, coincidently with the formation of social and family differences, and finally the formation of a gentry, nobility, and royalty on the average superior in military ability to the commoner. It is here at this point immediately thought by those unacquainted with the subject that nobility and royalty are not superior in natural ability, and if they become distinguished as soldiers it is because they are the only ones that are given any chance. If such were the truth of the matter, if the higher caste fell short in military ability, it would, of course, upset the whole idea that I am here bringing forward. But it is with certainty, or at least with the highest degree of probability, we may assert that these higher castes do meet the tests; and on the average, whatever the exceptions may be, the higher the caste the greater the percentage of successful soldiers. The proof for this assertion and that it is due to heredity cannot possibly be given here. It would cover many pages. Those interested may be referred to chapter XVII of *The Influence of Monarchs*. (Macmillan, 1913.)

II

IS WAR DIMINISHING?

Let us turn at once to the most generalized of our results, the grand averages as they are tabulated on Chart D by half-century periods from A.D. 1450 to the present day. The impression is in a moment obtained that certainly there is a falling-off in war. The lines slope downward like the sides of a great mountain chain. It is not a continuous fall, but the lines on the right are on a noticeably lower level than on the left. These lines mark off the percentages of war years by periods of fifty years each. Following the central line or average of the other two, we see it rising from 1450 to 1600, when it starts down very rapidly to 1750–1800 and rising again for 1800–1850. From 55 per cent, the grand average rises to 71 per cent, falls to 28 per cent, rises to 35 per cent, and falls to 22 per cent, the last half-century being the lowest of all.

If this chart were for the entire history of Europe from the earliest records to the present day it would be very satisfactory and conclusive. It would then seem that the time devoted to organized warfare had risen with the development of large national units

and had declined with the advance of civilization. If our great peak were, say, the fifth century, and our lesser peak on the right were the period of the Reformation, then again it would be very significant. But the chart as it actually stands does not do more than throw a moderate amount of probability in favor of declining war years. That is because its range of time is not long enough. We would like very much to see the percentages for the centuries prior to the fifteenth. If these should be found to be as high as or higher than the period 1450–1700, it would be indicative that the drop from 1700 to 1900 presaged a new movement in humanity's evolution and not a minor wave in the long roll of the ages. European war years have been diminishing for two centuries, but it must be remembered that while two hundred years seem a long time, two hundred years are as a few moments in the hundreds of thousands of years that mankind has been on this planet. Even if man has existed only one hundred thousand years (which is a low estimate), if the whole chart is a foot wide, then two centuries make the space between one thirty-second and one sixty-fourth of an inch. And it is with the psychology of war, human instincts and elemental passions that our problem is bound up. If a year of research

will enable one to examine about one thirty-second of an inch of the curve of war, or about one fifth of one per cent of one particular side of the whole problem, how much chance have the superficial philosophers of war who are so freely expressing themselves, of doing anything more than satisfying their own subjective emotions, of making a little money, and getting their pictures in the newspapers. Some might say that since the inductive method has only given one thirty-second of an inch out of a foot, the deductive method is the only one that has any chance. But my reply is that the arguers have not got anywhere; that the little portion of the curve that I have examined is found declining; and furthermore, I should hope that some one will work in other regions of history and report on other dates.

This curve on Chart D may be looked at from another point of view, which shows that it is probable that war years are declining, but not at all certain. If we divide the whole line into parts of about the same length as the small rising line 1750–1850, we then get approximately eight parts, three of which are ascending (+) and five of which are descending (—). These are, in the order from left to right: +, +, —, —, —, —, +, —. Anybody knows that a coin might fall head, head, tail,

tail, tail, tail, head, tail, without awakening curiosity or comment. But ours is not as meaningless a case as that. Our figures do have some significance, since the "pluses" are more to the left and the "minuses" are more to the right. Also the "minuses" exceed the "pluses" 5 to 3.

The next question is, — In what types of nations has this decline been the greatest? On Chart D the five strong powers, England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, are separated from the five lesser powers, Turkey, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden. There it can be seen that it is the stronger nations since 1700 that have devoted the most time to war. Moreover, the lesser nations were once the great powers. Spain, Turkey, Holland, and Sweden were active in warfare at the same period that they were politically great.

A study of Chart B does not make one feel that the vigorous countries have notably renounced trial by force. The lines for England, France, and Russia would never suggest that militarism is ceasing. All show abrupt fluctuations, but no tendency in one direction more than another. Austria gives a striking decline, but Austria is certainly not to-day in the same position of importance relatively to other nations that she was in the sixteenth

century, when we find her fighting eighty per cent of the time.

Prussia alone, among the expanding nationalities, exhibits a decline in war years. Yet it cannot be readily believed that modern Prussia has set a shining example of pacific policy. Her methods have been aggressive; her wars swift and important. The time element is not the only aspect of the philosophy of war, although in this research it is our chief concern. So much, then, for the broader conclusions warranted by our dates of war and peace.

It seems worth while also to analyze the history of each country by itself, to comment on special characteristics and to indicate some special directions that would seem to repay further research. Especially interesting is the relationship between war and national progress, territorial and other materialistic progress, gains and losses on the economic balance-sheet, religious and intellectual awakenings, artistic and literary revivals, all of which doubtless have some correlation with war either negative or positive. It remains for the future to disclose these grand interactions. We can at present do little more than mention a few salient facts as they seem to relate to the causes and effects of warfare.

III

AUSTRIA AND THE HAPSBURGS [1]

AUSTRIA'S career as a fighting power reached its apogee in the West in the Thirty Years' War (1618–48). Since then a steady decline in the amount of war has gone on, and this despite the participation of the Monarchy in practically every great European struggle until the middle of the last century.

The first two centuries after 1450 were filled with an enormous number of wars in the Austrian dominions, especially in her eastern provinces, where Hungarian and Turk were almost equally her foes. Those were the days of the Huniadi in Hungary, men whose scabbards rusted, but their swords never. Matthias Corvin Huniadi followed his father, John, and in turn was succeeded by the two Zapolyas, who ruled part of Hungary during most of the sixteenth century. The Huniadi fought with the Emperor frequently; the Zapolyas even leagued themselves with the Turk against him. A triangular struggle thus developed, which was carried on by other Hungarian and Transylvanian chieftains, the Báthorys and Rákoczys in Tran-

[1] The analysis of the nations is arranged alphabetically.

sylvania and Bethlen Gabor and the Toekleys in Hungary proper. Such were the relations of Austria, Hungary, and Turkey until the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718.

In Bohemia, Austria had another annoying problem. In 1450, Bohemia had just emerged from the Hussite Wars. George Podiebrad stirred the embers up again, engaging in war with Matthias Corvin Huniadi, as well as with the Emperor, and after his death in 1471 the same state of affairs went on until the crushing blow of the White Mountain in 1620 ended Bohemia's separate existence.

The figures below show the total number of years in which Austria was engaged in war, divided into fifty and hundred year periods beginning in 1450 and ending in the year 1900.

1450–1500	1500–1550	1550–1600	1600–1650	1650–1700	1700–1750	1750–1800	1800–1850	1850–1900
37	36	39.5	40.5	33	29	19.5	7.5	6
	75.5		73.5		48.5		13.5	

From 1600 to 1650 there were 40.5 years of warfare, or 81 per cent. The fall from that time to 1900 can be seen to be very rapid and continuous. It is a remarkable decline and is paralleled only by Prussia.

Austria, 1450–1914

Regency, 1439–1457

1446–1453. The Emperor at odds with the nobility of Hungary and Bohemia.
1454–1456. Raid of Mahomet II of Turkey. Hostilities ended without treaty.

Frederick III and Albert, 1457–1463

1461–1463. The Emperor at war with other Hapsburgs in Austria.
1462. Matthias Corvin Huniadi.
1462. Podiebrad of Bohemia, at war with North German States.

Frederick III, 1463–1493

1463–1464. Huniadi at war with the Sultan of Turkey.
1468. Frederick III's invasion of rebellious Bohemia.
1468–1469. Huniadi of Hungary, Catholic champion against Podiebrad of Bohemia.
1469–1480. Turkey.
1470. Bohemia at war with Hungary again.
1471–1478. Continuation of semi-Hussite war between Bohemia and Hungary.
1477–1478. Emperor at war with Hungary.
1478. Bauernkrieg in Karinthia.
1480–1491. Emperor against Hungary, ended by Peace of Pressburg.
1482–1483. Hungarian aggressions against the Turks.
1490–1495. Hungary at war with Turkey.

Maximilian I, 1493–1519

1495. France. League against Charles VIII.
1496–1497. France.
1499. Swiss Confederation, ended by Peace of Basel.
1499–1502. Leagued with Venice and Pope, against Turkey.
1508–1513. Venice. League of Cambrai.
1512–1519. Turkey; ended by three years' truce.
1512–1514. France, Emperor leagued with Pope and "Holy League."
1513–1518. Venice; ended by a truce.
1514. Bauernkrieg in Hungary.
1515. Bauernkrieg in Austria.

Charles V, 1519–1521

Ferdinand I, 1521–1564

1521–1531. Turkey and Zapolya of Hungary.
1521–1526. France; ended by Treaty of Madrid.
1522–1523. Knights' War. Rebellion of Sickengen, etc.
1524–1526. Bauernkrieg in Sachsen, etc.
1526–1529. France; ended by Peace of Cambrai.
1532–1534. Turkey and Zapolya of Hungary.
1534. War in Württemberg against Philip of Hesse, etc.
1535. Charles V's expedition against Tunis.
1536–1538. France; ended by Treaty of Nice.
1537–1540. Revolt of Ghent.
1537–1538. Zapolya of Hungary; ended by Peace of Grosswardein.
1537–1547. Turkey; ended by a five years' truce.
1541. Charles V's unsuccessful expedition against Algiers.
1542–1544. France; ended by Peace of Crépy.
1546–1547. Schmalkaldic League. Battle of Mühlberg.
1551–1562. Turkey; ended by a seven years' truce.
1552. War with Maurice of Sachsen; ended by Convention of Passau.
1552–1556. France; ended by Truce of Vaucelles.

Maximilian II, 1564–1576

1565–1568. Turkey; ended by Peace of Adrianople, which was renewed.

Rudolph II, 1576–1612

1575–1593. Partisan warfare in Hungary against the Turks.
1587–1588. Poland, in support of Maximilian's claim to throne.
1593–1606. Turkey; ended by Peace of Zsitva-Mundung.

Matthias, 1612–1619

1611–1612. Báthory of Transylvania.
1614–1615. Bethlen Gabor of Hungary.
1615–1618. Venice; ended by Peace of Madrid.

Ferdinand II, 1619–1637

Ferdinand III, 1637–1657

1618–1648. Thirty Years' War; ended by Peace of Westphalia.

Leopold I, 1657–1705

1657–1662. Rákoczy, of Hungary, at war with Poland and Turkey.
1657–1660. The Emperor, ally of Poland, at war with Sweden and allies.
1661–1664. Turkey; ended by twenty years' truce at Temeswaer.
1670–1671. Rebellion against Hapsburgs in Hungary led by Toekely.
1673–1679. France, ended by Peace of Nijmwegen.
1675–1679. Sweden.
1676–1687. Hungarian rebellion, led by Emerich Toekely.
1680. Rebellion of Bohemian peasantry.
1682–1699. Turkey; ended by Peace of Carlowitz.
1688–1697. France; ended by Peace of Ryswick.

Joseph I, 1705–1711

1701–1714. France; ended by Peace of Rastadt.
1701–1711. Revolt of Francis Rákoczy II; ended by Treaty of Szothmar.

Charles VI, 1711–1740

1716–1718. Turkey; ended by Peace of Passarowitz.
1718–1720. Spain. War of the Quadruple Alliance.
1733–1735. France and Poland. War of the Polish Succession.
1737–1739. Turkey; ended by Peace of Belgrade.

Maria Theresa, 1740–1780

1740–1748. France; ended by Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.
1740–1742. Prussia; ended by Peace of Breslau. First Silesian War.
1744–1745. Prussia; ended by Peace of Dresden. Second Silesian War.
1756–1763. Prussia; ended by Peace of Hubertsburg. Third Silesian War.
1778–1779. Prussia; ended by Peace of Teschen, mediated by Russia.

Joseph II, 1780–1790

1787–1791. Turkey; ended by Peace of Sistova.
1787–1790. Revolt in Belgian provinces, especially Brabant.

Leopold II, 1790–1792

Francis II, 1792–1835

1792–1797. France; ended by Peace of Campo Formio. First Coalition.
1798–1801. France; ended by Peace of Lunéville. Second Coalition.

1805. France; ended by Peace of Pressburg. Third Coalition.
1809. France; ended by Treaty of Schönbrunn.
1809. Russia.
1812–1813. Russia.
1813–1814. France; ended by First Treaty of Paris.
1815. France. *Les Cent Jours.*
1815. Naples; ended by flight of Murat.
1821. Intervention in Naples and Sardinia.
1831–1832. Risings in Modena, Parma, and the Romagna.

Ferdinand I, 1835–1848

1840. Intervention in Egyptian imbroglio.
1846. Risings in Galicia and Cracow, put down by the powers.
1848. Second Vienna insurrection; ended by capture of Vienna by Windischgrätz.

Francis Joseph, 1848–

1848–1849. Sardinia. Campaign of Novara.
1848–1849. Hungarian insurrection, put down by Russians at Villagos.
1848. Denmark. Austria took part as member of Germanic Confederation.
1859. France and Sardinia; ended by Peace of Zurich.
1864. Denmark, Austria the ally of Prussia. Peace of Vienna.
1866. Prussia, ended by Peace of Prag. The Seven Weeks' War.
1869–1870. Rising in Dalmatia.
1878–1879. Occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
1881–1882. Risings in the Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Southern Dalmatia.
1897–1898. Intervention in Crete.
1914– . Servia, Russia, France, England, Belgium, Japan, Italy.

IV

DENMARK

DENMARK is the only country that never gives as much as fifty per cent of war years during any half-century. It has been the most peaceful of all the nations, and hence we have the suggestion that a more profound study than is usually accorded to the history of Denmark would be well worth while. The figures in half-centuries show a fair improvement with the course of time. Below are seen the years of war in each half-century and in each century.

1500		1600		1700		1800		1900
15.5	22.5	10	21.5	9	11	1	10	5
	32.5		30.5		12		15	

Denmark was once a great and powerful nation, but that was back in the fourteenth century, in the days of Valdemar III and the great Queen Margaret, anterior to the commencement of our own dates. Subsequent to 1450, Denmark has never been more than a small and unimportant unit from the geographical or political point of view. There has existed, for most of the time, a good share of general prosperity in Denmark, a good

average intelligence, and a widely diffused wealth among the middle classes, — not much poverty and not many very rich people. Denmark's history presents many long periods of peace. There was one such of fifty-two years in the seventeenth century from 1720 to 1772.

Denmark, 1450–1914

Christian I, 1448–1481

1451–1457. War in Scania against Karl Knutson.
1459–1460. Raids in Holstein.
1463. Expedition against Russia.
1463–1465. Sweden, in Scania.
1467–1471. War in Scania against Swedes.

John, 1481–1513

1495–1497. War for the Swedish Crown.
1500. War in Ditmarsh.
1501–1513. Sweden.
1502–1506. Norway, the ally of Sweden.
1508–1512. Norway.
1512. Lubeck and the Hansa.

Christian II, 1513–1523

1516–1520. Sweden. Conquest of Sweden by Danes.
1521–1524. Swedish revolt against Danes under Gustavus Vasa.

Frederick I, 1523–1533

1522–1525. Revolt in Denmark.
1531–1532. Civil war.

Interregnum, 1533–1534

1534. Revolt in Jutland.

Christian III, 1534–1559

1535–1536. War in Fionia and with Lubeck.

Frederick II, 1559–1588

1559. Conquest of Ditmarsh.
1561–1570. Russia. First Great Northern War.
1563–1570. Sweden. First Great Northern War.

Regency, 1588–1596

Christian IV, 1596–1648

1600–1611. Sweden. War of Kalmar.
1616–1618. Sweden. War of Kalmar.
1620–1622. Sweden. War of Kalmar.
1625–1626. Sweden. War of Kalmar.
1625–1629. Empire. Thirty Years' War; ended by Peace of Lubeck.
1626–1628. Sweden. War of Kalmar.
1628–1629. Sweden. End of War of Kalmar by Truce of Altmark.
1630. Hamburg.
1638. Destruction of Polish fleet near Dantzig.
1643. Hamburg.
1643–1645. Sweden.

Frederick III, 1648–1670

1657–1658. Sweden; ended by Treaty of Roeskilde.
1658–1660. Sweden; ended by Peace of Copenhagen.
1666–1667. England; ended by Treaty of Breda.

Christian V, 1670–1699

1675–1679. Sweden and France; ended by treaties of Lund and Fontainebleau.
1676–1679. Hamburg.
1686. Hamburg.

Frederick IV, 1699–1730

1699–1700. Sweden, ended by Treaty of Travendal.
1700. Prince of Gottorp.
1709–1720. Sweden. Second participation in Third Great Northern War.

Christian VI, 1730–1746

Frederick V, 1746–1766

Christian VII, 1766–1784

1772. Overthrow of Stuensee.

Frederick VI, 1784–1839

1788. Sweden.
1801. England.
1807–1814. England. Danes in alliance with Napoleon.
1808–1809. Sweden. Danes in alliance with Russia.
1813–1814. Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Sweden; ended by Peace of Kiel.

Christian VIII, 1839–1848

Frederick VII, 1848–1863

1848–1851. Revolts in Schleswig-Holstein.
1848–1849. Prussia and the German Confederation.
1849. Prussia.
1849–1850. German Confederation.

Christian IX, 1863–1906

1864. Austria and Prussia; ended by Peace of Vienna.

V

ENGLAND

As a broad general statement it is fair to say that all nations have devoted about half their time to war and half to peace. The exact figures for the average of all nations here studied is 48 per cent war and 52 per cent peace, for the period 1450–1900.

England in comparison with other countries has done her share of fighting, perhaps a little more. She totals 419 war years in eight centuries, or 52.4 per cent. Except for England and France, we have not carried the research into the period prior to 1450, but for these two countries we are able to present the earlier dates and these must be viewed with considerable interest. They extend the series backward by seven half-centuries, and these, added to the nine later half-centuries, give a long enough stretch to make one expect to come upon evidence of a declining curve or general tendency for war periods to diminish. Such, however, is not the case either for England or France. The English figures are here given for the eight centuries studied.

1100		1200		1300		1400		1500		1600		1700		1800		1900
38	16	19	17	39.5	25.5	38	19	16	38.5	17.5	26	29	26.5	26	27.5	
54		36		65		57		54.5		43.5		55.5		53.5		
212 war years								207 war years								

These figures vary from 16 out of 50 to 39.5 out of 50. The first 400 years show 212 years of war, the second 400 years show 207. The difference of only 5 years is negligible in such a large total.

Such facts as these, concerning as they do one of the dominant civilized nations of the earth, make us pause in serious thought. It cannot be said that the later wars were trivial in comparison to the earlier. It is true that a large number of the English wars in the nineteenth century were fought in distant climes to maintain the Empire against inferior foes, and were small in comparison with the population of the realm; but, on the other hand, many of the early wars, so-called, were merely insurrections soon stamped under foot. Yes, England has been a conquering nation and she has fought more than half of the time. Her three great maximum eras of belligerency occurred in the years 1100–1150; 1300–1450; 1550–1600. The chief generalization concerning these three periods is that they were all largely filled with combats against alien races, and were fought for the domination of these races. The long wars in the first part of the twelfth century against Normandy and France were chiefly dynastic in their motives and were to maintain Henry I in his possessions across the Channel. The second

great period, 1300–1450, contains first the attempted conquest of Scotland and then the "Hundred Years' War," or the attempted conquest of France. All these had a strong personal and dynastic setting, though, of course, other motives entered. The third great era, 1550–1600, is represented by the struggle against Spain, commercial and partly religious in its causation.

It is to be noted that the "Wars of the Roses," the civil wars of the Stuarts, and other internal dissensions in England do not swell the war years beyond the average point. This gives statistical support to the notion that England has on the whole been a well and harmoniously governed country.

England, 1100–1914

Henry I, 1100–1135

1101. Robert of Normandy.
1102. Rebellion of Robert of Bellesme.
1104–1106. Invasion of Normandy, both civil and foreign war.
1106–1128. A continuation of the war against Normandy and France.

Stephen, 1135–1154

1136–1138. Scottish invasions. Battle of the Standards.
1138–1148. Civil war between Stephen and Matilda.
1149–1150. Civil war renewed between Stephen and Matilda.
1152–1153. Civil war again renewed between Stephen and Matilda.

Henry II, 1154–1189

1158. Welsh War.
1163. Second Welsh War.

1165. Third Welsh War.
1169–1172. War in Ireland.
1173–1174. Rebellion, headed by Prince Henry.
1188–1189. France in alliance with Princes Richard and John.

Richard I, 1189–1199

1190–1192. Third Crusade.
1194–1200. France.

John, 1199–1216

1200–1202. Rebellion of the Poictevin nobles.
1202–1204. France in alliance with the Poictevin nobles. Bouvines.
1213–1214. France. The campaign of Bouvines.
1215–1216. France. John's last war.

Regency, 1216–1227

1216–1217. France.
1219–1223. Welsh War.
1223–1225. France.
1224. Welsh War.

Henry III, 1227–1272

1228–1231. Welsh War.
1233–1234. Welsh War.
1241. Welsh War.
1241–1243. France. Henry III's loss of Poitou.
1245. France.
1257. War in Wales against Llewelyn and Griffith.
1259. France.
1263–1267. Civil War of Simon de Montfort against Henry III.

Edward I, 1272–1307

1272–1276. Edward I's First Welsh War, against Llewelyn.
1277. A continuation of the Welsh War.
1282–1283. Third Welsh War, against Llewelyn and David.
1294–1298. France, on sea and in Guyenne.
1294–1295. Welsh War (fourth).
1296. Conquest of Scotland.
1297–1304. Scottish War.
1306–1307. Bruce's rebellion in Scotland.

Edward II, 1307–1327

1310. Scottish expedition of Piers Gaveston.
1311–1323. Scotland. Bannockburn.
1321–1322. Revolt against Edward II.
1324–1327. France, in Guyenne.
1326–1327. Final revolt against Edward II.

Regency, 1327–1330

1326–1328. Scotland. Scottish independence recognized.

Edward III, 1330–1377

1332–1357. Scottish intervention and war.
1337–1340. France. Beginning in Bretagne of the Hundred Years' War.
1341–1347. Renewal of Hundred Years' War. Campaign of Crécy. Calais.
1355–1357. France. Campaign of Poitiers.
1359–1360. France; ended by Treaty of Brétigny.
1367–1368. Interference in Castilian War in favor of Pedro.
1369–1375. France. Capture of Limoges. John of Gaunt's expedition.

Regency, 1377–1389

1377–1380. France and Scotland.
1381. Wat Tyler's rebellion.
1383–1389. France.

Richard II, 1389–1399

1385–1387. War of the Lords Appellant in Scotland.
1388. Chevy Chase campaign in Scotland and Northumberland.
1394–1395. First Irish expedition.
1399. Second Irish expedition.
1399. Lancaster's expedition.

Henry IV, 1399–1413

1400. Rebellion for Richard II in Rutland and elsewhere.
1400–1409. Welsh rebellion under Owen Glendower.
1402–1403. Scottish invasion under Douglas.
1403. Percy's rebellion.
1405. Scroope's rebellion.
1405. Depredations of French fleet off Welsh coast.

1406. Renewal of Hundred Years' War.
1408. Northumberland's rebellion.
1411. Intervention in France in favor of the Burgundians.
1412. Intervention in France in favor of the Armagnacs.

Henry V, 1413–1422

1415–1420. France; ended by the Peace of Troyes. Agincourt.
1421–1422. France. Last campaign of Henry V.

Regency, 1422–1440

1423–1439. France. English under Bedford, York, and Warwick.

Henry VI, 1440–1461

1440–1444. France; ended by Angevin Marriage Treaty.
1448–1450. France. Loss of Normandy, etc.
1450. Cade's rebellion.
1450–1453. France. End of the Hundred Years' War in failure.
1455. Beginning of the Wars of the Roses.
1459–1464. Wars of the Roses, ending with Lancastrian defeat at Hexham.

Edward IV, 1461–1483

1469–1471. Wars of the Roses. Lancastrian defeats at Barnet and Tewkesbury.
1475. Invasion of France and Peace of Pécquigny.
1480. Scotland, ended by Treaty of Fotheringay.
1482–1484. Scotland.

Richard III, 1483–1485

1483. Buckingham's rebellion.
1485. Successful campaign of Henry Tudor for the crown.

Henry VII, 1485–1509

1486. Lovell's rising.
1487. Lambert Simnel's rising.
1489–1492. France, in Bretagne.
1495. Perkin Warbeck's first expedition for English crown.
1496–1497. Warbeck's second expedition.

Henry VIII, 1509–1547

1512–1514. France. Battle of the Spurs.
1513–1515. Scotland. Campaign of Flodden Field.
1522–1523. Scotland.

1522–1525. France. Invasion of France a failure. Amicable loan.
1532–1534. Scotland.
1534–1535. Fitzgerald's Irish expedition.
1542–1546. Scotland. Campaign of Solway Moss, etc.
1544–1546. France. Siege of Boulogne.

Regency, 1547–1553

1547–1548. Interference of Somerset in Scotland.
1548–1550. Scotland.
1548–1550. France.
1549. Rebellion in Devon.
1549. Ket's rebellion.

Mary, 1553–1558

1557–1559. France. Loss of Calais.

Elizabeth, 1558–1603

1559–1560. Scotland and France; ended by Treaty of Edinburgh.
1561–1567. Rebellion of Shawn O'Neill in Ulster.
1562–1564. Alliance with Huguenots at Hampton Court and French War.
1569. Rising of Catholic nobles in North of England.
1569–1583. Fitzmaurice and the Munster rebellion.
1585–1604. Spain. Armada campaign.
1594–1603. Hugh O'Neill's rebellion in Ulster.

James I, 1603–1624

1624–1625. English intervention in Thirty Years' War.

Charles I, 1624–1649

1625–1630. Spain.
1627–1630. France. La Rochelle expedition.
1639. First Bishops' War.
1640. Second Bishops' War.
1641–1643. Irish rebellion.
1642–1646. First part of the great Civil War.
1648. Second part of the great Civil War.

The Commonwealth, 1649–1660

1649–1652. Cromwell's Irish War.
1650–1651. Scottish War, the invasion under Charles Stuart.
1652–1654. Holland. Blake *vs.* Van Tromp.

1654–1659. Spain, ended by Peace of Pyrenees.
1655. Penruddock's rising in Salisbury.
1655. Coercion of the Barbary States.

Charles II, 1660–1685

1661. Venner's rising.
1664–1667. Holland; ended by Treaty of Breda. Capture of Dutch America.
1666–1667. France; ended by Treaty of Breda.
1666–1667. Denmark; ended by Treaty of Breda.
1672–1674. Holland. Charles II in alliance with Louis XIV. Peace of Westminster.
1677–1679. Rising of the Covenanters in Scotland.

James II, 1685–1689

1685. Monmouth's rebellion.

William and Mary, 1689–1702

1688–1692. Struggle of William III against James II.
1688–1697. France and her allies. War of the League of Augsburg.
1700. Participation in Dano-Swedish War.

Anne, 1702–1714

1701–1713. France and her allies. War of the Spanish Succession.

George I, 1714–1727

1715–1716. The Old Pretender.
1715–1719. Naval action against Sweden.
1718–1720. Spain. War of the Quadruple Alliance.
1720–1721. Naval action against Russia and her allies.

George II, 1727–1760

1727–1729. Spain; ended by Treaty of Seville.
1739–1748. Spain. War of Jenkins's Ear.
1740–1748. France and Prussia. War of the Austrian Succession.
1745–1746. The Young Pretender.
1755–1763. France and her allies. Seven Years' War.

George III, 1760–1811

1762–1763. Spain. England in alliance with Portugal.
1763–1765. Emperor Shar Alam in India.
1764. Sepoy Mutiny.

1770. Friction with Spain in Falkland Islands.
1775–1783. War of American Independence. Treaty of Paris.
1778–1783. France in alliance with American revolutionists.
1778–1781. Mahratta War.
1779–1783. Spain; ended by Treaty of Paris.
1780–1783. Holland.
1792. Tippu Sahib.
1793–1802. France; ended by Treaty of Amiens.
1795–1802. Holland, the ally of France.
1799. Tippu Sahib, in alliance with Bonaparte.
1801. Denmark.
1802–1806. Mahrattas, led by Holkar.
1803–1814. France, ended by first Treaty of Paris.
1806. Sepoy Mutiny.
1807. Attack on Turks at Constantinople.
1807–1812. Russia, the ally of France in her Continental System.

George IV (*Regent*, 1811; *King*, 1820–1830)

1812–1815. United States. Battle of New Orleans after Treaty of Ghent.
1814–1815. War in Nepal.
1815. France. *Les Cent Jours*, and Waterloo.
1816. Attack on Algiers.
1817. Pindari War.
1817–1818. Last Mahratta War.
1824–1826. War in Burma.
1827. Assistance to the Greeks against Turkey at Navarino.

William IV, 1830–1837

1831–1832. Action in Belgium.

Victoria, 1837–1901

1837. Rebellion in Canada.
1838–1842. War in Afghanistan.
1840–1841. Interference, together with other powers, in Egyptian War.
1840–1842. Opium War in China.
1845. Interference in Uruguay.
1845. First Sikh War.
1848–1849. Second Sikh War.
1850–1852. War with the Kaffirs.
1854–1856. Russia. Crimean War.
1856–1859. China; ended by Treaty of Tien-Tsin.

1856–1857. Persia.
1857–1858. Sepoy rebellion. Relief of Lucknow.
1861–1862. Participation in expedition to Mexico.
1863–1869. Maori War.
1867–1868. Abyssinian expedition.
1874. Ashanti War.
1879. Zulu War.
1880–1881. War in the Transvaal.
1882–1884. Acquisition of Egypt.
1884–1885. Gordon's Soudan expedition.
1884–1885. Relief expedition to save Gordon.
1885. Riel's revolt in Canada.
1885–1889. War in Burma.
1895. War in India.
1895. Jameson Raid in South Africa.
1896. Ashanti expedition.
1896–1900. War in Egypt.
1899–1902. Boer rebellion in South Africa.
1900. Participation in suppression of Boxer rebellion in China.

Edward VII, 1901–1910

1901–1902. Somaliland expedition of English and Abyssinians.

George V, 1910–

1914– Germany, Austria, and Turkey.

VI

FRANCE

WHAT was said for England may be said for France. Here we have eight centuries of the records of battles and no lessening in the time they fill. In fact, there is a slight increase from the first four centuries to the last four. The figures below represent the number of fighting years during each half-century and century.

1100		1200		1300		1400		1500		1600		1700		1800		1900
26.5	10	31.5	17.5	18	25	35.5	17	29.5	31	24	22.5	25	25.5	18	17	
36.5		49		43		52.5		60.5		46.5		50.5		35		
181								192.5								

The first portion of the record totals 181 years of war; the second totals 192.5. Thus, if we had paid attention alone to the second half of the record, we should have received an erroneous impression. The high mark, 31 years, during the half-century 1550–1600, and the two low marks, 18 and 17, during the nineteenth century, would have led to the false belief that French history gives evidence of decline of belligerent activity. It may be that the smaller figures 18 and 17 are really significant and due to the heightening of "civilization"; to moral causes not operative

in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The low figures in those centuries may have been due to causes more materialistic, economic or physical. This is possible. All we can say is, statistically there is no warrant from the history of France (or from the history of England) that warfare is becoming less important or that it is engaging less of the time and attention of mankind with the slow and gradual development of social evolution.

French wars have been frequent, though they have seldom been of great duration. Her longest period of war lasted twenty-five years, when the Revolutionary and Napoleonic convulsion involved her continually in either foreign or civil war from 1789 to 1814. Her second longest continuous war period, 1635–1659, was her great struggle against the house of Hapsburg, which included part of the "Thirty Years' War" against Austria and the Spanish War ending in the "Peace of the Pyrenees." There was a great deal of fighting during the first half of the thirteenth century. These wars were important for France. They prevented domination of the North by England, and in the South they were wars of conquest.

From 1400 to 1450 there was another period of excessive warfare. It was the last half of the "Hundred Years' War"; but it

should be noted that the entire "Hundred Years' War" had many intermissions, so that during this period about forty per cent of the years were of peace. The third great era of wars, 1550–1600, was less creditable to France and it did not aid in any national upbuilding. This was the period of the Guises, of Catherine de Medici, and of the Huguenot civil wars. Thus the history of France shows somewhat more civil warfare than does that of England, but neither of these countries has been guilty of an excessive amount of internal destruction. It must be remembered that what we now call France was built up largely by conquests, added from time to time to the nucleus that originally lay about Paris. Of course France has been, on the whole, successful in war and a conquering country, otherwise the territory between Belgium, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Atlantic would not now be called France.

France, 1100–1914

Louis VI, 1108–1137

1104–1106. England.
1106–1128. England.
1108–1116. Civil war.

Louis VII, 1137–1180

1142. War with Thibaud de Champagne.
1147–1149. Second Crusade.
1154–1155. Attack on Normandy.
1173–1174. Aid given the revolting English princes.

Philip Augustus, 1180–1223

1188–1189. Aid given Richard and John, of England, against Henry II.
1190–1191. Third Crusade.
1194–1200. England.
1202–1204. England.
1207–1208. War in Acquitaine.
1207–1215. Raimond of Toulouse. First Albigensian War (Crusade).
1213–1214. England. Campaign of Bouvines.
1215–1216. England.
1216–1217. England.
1216–1222. Raimond of Toulouse. Second Albigensian War.

Louis VIII, 1223–1226

1223–1225. England.
1223–1226. Third Albigensian War.

Regency, 1226–1236

1226–1229. Fourth Albigensian War; ended by Treaty of Paris.
1226–1231. Strife with the barons.
1233–1234. Strife with the barons.

Louis IX, 1236–1270

1241–1243. England. Recovery of Poitou by the French.
1244. Fifth Albigensian War, and extermination of Albigensians.
1245. England.
1248–1254. Seventh Crusade.
1251. First rising of the Pastoureaux.
1253–1255. War in Flanders.
1259. England.
1268. Expedition of Charles of Anjou in Italy.
1270. Eighth Crusade.

Philip III, 1270–1285

1276. Castile.

Philip IV, 1285–1314

1284–1291. Aragon.
1294–1298. England and Flanders.
1300–1305. War in Flanders. Campaign of Courtrai.
1314. War in Flanders.

Louis X, 1314–1316

1315. War in Flanders.

Philip V, 1316–1322

1320. Second Pastoureaux rising.

Charles IV, 1322–1328

1324–1327. England, in Guyenne.
1328. Flemish War. Campaign of Cassel.

Philip VI, 1328–1350

1337–1340. England. Beginning of the Hundred Years' War.
1341–1347. England. Campaign of Crécy; loss of Calais; Hundred Years' War.

John II, 1350–1356

1355–1357. England. Campaign of Poitiers. Hundred Years' War.

Charles V, 1356–1360

1357–1358. Rebellion of Étienne Marcel.
1359–1360. England. Hundred Years' War broken by Peace of Brétigny.

John II, 1360–1364

1363–1364. War in Bretagne.

Charles V, 1364–1380

1365–1368. Interference in Castilian War in favor of Henry of Trastamara.
1369–1375. England. John of Gaunt's failure and French gains.
1377–1380. England. Hundred Years' War.

Regency, 1380–1388

1381–1382. Popular risings in Paris, les Maillotins, etc.
1382. War in Flanders. Campaign of Rosebeke.
1383. Repression in Northern France.
1383–1389. England. Hundred Years' War.

Charles VI, 1388–1422

1395–1396. Ten thousand troops sent against the Turks.
1405. Naval resumption of Hundred Years' War.
1405–1407. Civil war of Burgundians against Orléanists.

1406. Renewal of Hundred Years' War.
1408. Civil war resumed by Burgundians and Orléanists.
1410. Civil war between Burgundians and Armagnacs (Orléanists).
1411–1415. Civil war between Burgundians and Armagnacs.
1415–1420. England; campaign of Agincourt; ended by Treaty of Troyes.
1418. Second Cabochien atrocities.
1421–1422. England. Hundred Years' War.

Charles VII, 1422–1461

1423–1439. England. Hundred Years' War. Era of Bedford, Jeanne Darc.
1440–1444. England; ended by Angevin Marriage Treaty.
1448–1450. England. Recovery of Normandy.
1450–1453. England. End of the Hundred Years' War.

Louis XI, 1461–1483

1461. Acquisition of Cerdagne and Roussillon.
1465–1466. War of the Ligue du Bien Public; ended by Treaty of Conflans.
1468. Burgundy; ended by meeting at Peronne of Louis and Charles the Bold.
1470–1472. Burgundy.
1473. Trouble in Guyenne.
1475. Edward IV's invasion of France and Peace of Pêcquigny.
1478–1479. Occupation of Burgundy.

Regency, 1483–1491

1487–1488. Rebellion from Breton side.

Charles VIII, 1491–1498

1489–1492. England, in Bretagne.
1494–1497. Italian campaign of Charles VIII.
1495. War with the Emperor.
1496–1497. War with the Emperor.

Louis XII, 1498–1515

1499–1504. Italian War of Louis XII.
1502–1504. Spain, in Italy.
1507. Revolt in Genoa.

1508–1510. Venice. France in League of Cambrai.
1511–1513. Venice; ended by alliance. Venice, one of the "Holy League."
1511–1513. Spain, one of the "Holy League."
1512–1514. England, one of the "Holy League." Campaign of Guinegate.
1513–1514. The Empire, one of the "Holy League."

Francis I, 1515–1547

1515–1517. Italian campaign of Marignano.
1521–1526. First war against Charles V; ended by Treaty of Madrid.
1522–1525. England.
1526–1529. Second war against Charles V; ended by Peace of Cambrai.
1536–1538. Third war against Charles V; ended by Treaty of Nice.
1542–1544. Fourth war against Charles V; ended by Peace of Crépy.
1544–1546. England. Siege of Boulogne.
1546–1548. Interference in Scotland.

Henry II, 1547–1559

1548. Revolt in the Bordelais.
1548–1550. England.
1552–1556. War of Henry II against Charles V; ended by Truce of Vaucelles.
1556–1559. Spain; ended by Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.

Regency, 1559–1560

1557–1559. England; capture of Calais; ended by Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.
1559–1560. England; ended by Treaty of Edinburgh.
1560. Conspiration d'Amboise.

Regency, 1560–1571

1562–1563. First Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Amboise.
1562–1564. England, the ally of the Huguenots.
1567–1568. Second Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Longjumeau.
1569–1570. Third Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain.

Charles IX, 1571–1574

1572–1573. Fourth Huguenot War; ended by Edict of Boulogne.

Henry III, 1574–1589

1575–1576. Fifth Huguenot War; ended by Paix de Monsieur.
1576–1577. Sixth Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Poitiers.
1580. Seventh Huguenot War; ended by Treaty of Fleix.
1581–1583. Expeditions to Flanders.
1585–1594. War of the Three Henrys, then of Henry IV and the Ligue.

Henry IV, 1588–1610

1589–1598. Sapin, at first the ally of the Ligue.
1600–1601. War in Savoy.

Regency, 1610–1621

1615. Condé's rebellion.
1619. Struggle between Louis XIII and Marie de Medicis.

Louis XIII, 1621–1643

1621–1622. Huguenot War.
1625–1626. Huguenots of La Rochelle.
1627–1629. Huguenots of La Rochelle and Rohan.
1627–1630. England, giving aid to La Rochelle.
1629–1631. Spain, in Savoy.
1631–1632. Rebellion of Gaston d'Orléans and Montmorency.
1635–1648. Empire and its allies. Thirty Years' War.

Regency, 1643–1661

1648–1659. Spanish War continued to Peace of the Pyrenees.
1648–1649. La Fronde.
1650. La Fronde.
1650–1652. La Fronde.

Louis XIV, 1661–1715

1663–1664. Turkey. France the ally of the Emperor at St. Gothard.
1666–1667. England; ended by Treaty of Breda.
1667–1668. Spain; then Holland, England, and Sweden intervened.
1672–1678. Holland; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen.
1672–1678. Spain; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen.
1672–1673. Brandenburg-Prussia; ended by Peace of Vossem.
1673–1679. Austria; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen.
1674–1679. Empire; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen.
1674–1679. Brandenburg-Prussia; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

1675–1679. Denmark; ended by Peace of Fontainebleau.
1681. Seizure of Strassburg.
1682. Seizure of Luxemburg.
1683–1684. The Empire and Spain, and Truce of Regensburg.
1688–1697. War against the League of Augsburg; ended by Peace of Ryswick.
1701–1713. War of the Spanish Succession; ended by Peace of Utrecht.
1713–1714. War continued against Austria alone.

Regency, 1715–1723

1718–1720. Spain; war of the Quadruple Alliance.

Regency, 1723–1731

Louis XV, 1731–1774

1733–1735. Austria and Russia. War of the Polish Succession.
1740–1748. England and Austria. War of the Austrian Succession.
1743–1748. Holland. War of the Austrian Succession.
1755–1763. England and Prussia. Seven Years' War. Peace of Paris.
1768–1769. Annexation of Corsica.

Louis XVI, 1774–1793

1778–1783. England; France allied with American revolutionists.
1789–1793. The French Revolution.

Republic, 1793–1799

1792–1795. Prussia; ended by Peace of Basel.
1792–1797. Austria; ended by Treaty of Campo Formio.
1792–1796. Sardinia.
1793–1802. England; ended by Peace of Amiens.
1793–1801. Portugal.
1793–1795. Holland; ended by formation of Batavian Republic.
1793–1795. Spain; ended by Peace of Basel.
1798–1801. Austria; ended by Peace of Lunéville.
1798–1799. Naples; ended by formation of Parthenopean Republic.

Consulate, 1799–1804

1798–1801. Turkey.
1798–1800. Russia; ended by accession of Paul.
1799–1801. Naples; ended by Treaty of Florence.
1802–1803. Haytian revolts. Leclerc's expedition.

Napoleon, 1804–1814

1803–1814. England; ended by First Treaty of Paris.
1805. Austria; ended by Treaty of Pressburg. Third Coalition.
1805–1807. Russia; ended by Treaty of Tilsit.
1805–1810. Sweden; ended by Peace of Paris of 1810.
1806–1807. Prussia; ended by Treaty of Tilsit.
1807–1814. Portugal, the ally of England.
1808–1814. War with the Spanish people.
1809. Austria; ended by Treaty of Schönbrunn.
1812–1814. Russia; ended by First Treaty of Paris.
1812–1814. Prussia; ended by First Treaty of Paris.
1813–1814. Austria; ended by First Treaty of Paris.
1813–1814. Sweden; ended by First Treaty of Paris.

Louis XVIII, 1814–1815

Napoleon, Les Cent Jours

1815. England, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, etc., *Les Cent Jours.*

Louis XVIII, 1815–1824

1823. Repression by Bourbon Government of Spanish revolts.

Charles X, 1824–1830

1827. Turkey. Aid given Greeks at Navarino
1830. Revolution of July.
1830. Capture of Algiers.

Louis Philippe, 1830–1848

1836. Strassburg attempt of Louis Napoleon.
1840. Boulogne attempt of Louis Napoleon.
1840–1841. France opposed by the powers in the Egyptian imbroglio.
1848. Revolution of 1848.

Republic, 1848–1852

1849. War in Italy in defense of Papal States.

Napoleon III, 1852–1870

1854–1856. Russia. Crimean War; ended by Treaty of Paris.
1857–1859. Expedition to China.
1859. Austria; ended by Peace of Zurich.

1860–1861. Defense of Papal States.
1861–1867. Mexican enterprise.
1870–1871. Prussia and her allies; ended by Treaty of Frankfort.

Republic, 1870

1871. The Commune.
1881. Expedition to Tunis.
1882–1884. Black Flag War in Anam.
1884–1885. China; ended by treaty confirming Treaty of Tien-Tsin.
1893. War in Siam.
1895. Occupation of Madagascar.
1900. Participation in repression of Boxer Revolt in China.
1914– . Germany, Austria, and Turkey. War of the Alliances.

VII

HOLLAND

Years of War by Half-Centuries and by Centuries

1600		1700		1800		1900
48.5	36	26.5	18	11.5	14.5	0.0
	62.5		29.5		14.5	

From her sudden emergence as a real power during the third quarter of the sixteenth century, Holland has, with one exception, exhibited a steady line of diminution in warfare. Her history begins with the war of liberation from the Spanish yoke, which is quite as bloody a page as any in the war book of the nations. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, she fought less and less, tracing a curve the significance of which will be alluded to later. She took no slight part in the Thirty Years' War, and fought later against the Bourbon domination in Europe. The exception to her general downward tendency is that introduced by the French Revolution, when the little country was gathered in by France and taken in the meshes of war much against her will.

Holland and Sweden are the only countries here tabulated that have been able to avoid war altogether in any period of fifty years, a

fact due, perhaps, to impotence rather than to strength.

Holland, 1566–1914

1566–1567. Revolt of the "Beggars."

William the Silent, cir. 1575–1584

1568–1579. War of Independence.

Maurice of Nassau, 1584–1625

1579–1609. War of liberation against Spain, after declaration.
1618. Overthrow of Oldenbarnveldt.

Frederick Henry, 1625–1647

1621–1648. Continuation of war with Spain.

William II, 1647–1650

The States, 1650–1672

1652–1654. England. Van Tromp *vs.* Blake.
1657–1661. Portugal.
1658–1660. Sweden. Part of Second Great Northern War.
1664–1665. Hostilities with England.
1665–1667. Open war with England; ended by Treaty of Breda.
1667–1668. France. War of Devolution.

William III, 1672–1702

1672–1674. England; ended by Treaty of Westminster.
1672–1678. France; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen.
1675–1679. Sweden.
1688–1697. France. War of the League of Augsburg.
1700. Intervention in Third Great Northern War.

The States, 1702–1747

1701–1713. France. War of the Spanish Succession.
1719–1720. Spain. War of the Quadruple Alliance.
1743–1748. France. War of the Austrian Succession.
1747. Orange Revolution.

William IV, 1747–1751

Regency, 1751–1759

Republic, 1759–1766

William V, 1766–1795

1780–1783. England.
1785. Democratic riots.
1786. Democratic riots.
1793–1795. France; ended by creation of Batavian Republic.

Republic, 1795–1805

1795–1802. England. Holland the ally of France.

Louis Bonaparte, 1806–1810

1798–1813. As ally of France, Holland followed her in every war.
1813–1814. Revolt against French régime.

William I, King of the Netherlands, 1815–1840

1815. France. *Les Cent Jours* and Waterloo.
1830. Separation of Belgium from Holland.

VIII

THE OLD KINGDOM OF POLAND

THE above war statistics of the old kingdom of Poland give us a figure with a gradual rise to an apex, a consistent increase in war from 1450 to the second half of the seventeenth century, when "The Deluge," as Sienkiewicz calls this cataclysm, bade fair to sweep the nation out of existence. After 1700 there was a remarkable falling off in war years. Wars were numerous in the days of Casimir IV, who ruled in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, and in the time of Sigismund I, in the first part of the sixteenth; but they were even more engaging in the second half of that cycle when the Poles, distracted by constant changes of dynasty, embarked in the First Great Northern War.

There was at that time a very conscious rivalry with the huge Slavic power to the East, and Poland revealed great military possibilities. A line of brilliant captains succeeded Stephen Báthory, the energetic Transylvanian prince, who was elected to fill the

throne, made vacant in 1574 by the rapid flight of Henry of Valois. Stephen fought some of the most splendid campaigns in all Polish history, driving Ivan the Terrible back, and forcing him to peace; but the reign of this great man was brief (1575–1586). After Stephen's death, Jan Zamoyski, the great chancellor, carried on the tradition, although, like Báthory and all other Polish commanders, he was hampered more than aided by the obstructive Diet at Warsaw.

Indeed, Poland had almost steadily advanced in prosperity since the beginning of the Jagiellonic period in 1386 to its close in 1572. Then, under Stephen Báthory, 1575–1586, her importance continued to grow, so that she was universally recognized as the great power of Eastern Europe. Her geographical limits were widely extended. With Lithuania united she stretched to the eastward and northward into much of what is now Russia. To the south she touched the Black Sea at Akerman and included much of what is now Austria and Roumania. On the east she extended for one hundred miles into what is now Prussia, reaching through to the Baltic Sea at Dantzig.

During her era of greatness Poland fought about half of the time, 54, 52, and 58 per cent. This ratio grew to 64 and 72 per cent for the next two half-centuries, which era may be

called the beginning of her political decline. After the year 1700 the amount of time devoted to warfare declined very considerably, being 33 and 11 per cent for the next two half-centuries, after which Poland ceased to exist as a political entity.

The summarization seems to be that three periods are found in Polish history. During the first she was politically a great power and fought an average amount. During the second, she declined in prestige, fighting more than an average amount. During the third, she declined in political strength and greatly in the amount of her belligerency.

POLAND, 1450–1795

Casimir IV, 1447–1492

1454–1466. Livonian Order.
1471–1479. Matthias Corvin Huniadi, of Hungary.
1486–1489. Turkey.
1490. Raid of Cossacks, Tatars, Magyars, etc.

John Albert, 1492–1501

1492–1494. War between Lithuania and Moscow.
1497. Short Turkish war.
1497–1498. Stephen of Moldavia.

Alexander, 1501–1506

1500–1503. Moscow.
1500–1506. Stephen of Moldavia.
1506. Khan of the Crimea.

Sigismund I, 1506–1548

1508. Moscow.
1510. Tatar raid.
1511–1526. Russia.

1516. Tatar raid.
1519. Tatar raid.
1520–1521. Livonian Order.
1527. Tatar raid.
1530. Moldavia.
1533. Tatar raid.
1534–1537. Russia.

Sigismund II, 1548–1572

1552. Interference in Wallachia.
1556–1557. Livonian Order. Beginning of the First Great Northern War.

Interregnum, 1572–1573

Henry of Valois, 1573–1574

Stephen Báthory, 1575–1586

1572–1575. Russia.
1575. Tatar invasion.
1583–1590. Turkish war along border.

Sigismund III, 1587–1632

1587–1588. Archduke Maximilian and the Zborowski.
1590. Confederation against Zamoyski.
1595. Turkey.
1596. Cossacks; put down by Zolkiewski.
1598–1600. Cossacks; again put down by Zolkiewski.
1600–1609. Sweden.
1606. Confederation of Zebryzdowski.
1607–1609. Insurrection of Zebryzdowski.
1609–1618. Russia; arose out of Russia's anarchy.
1613. Cossack expedition in Black Sea.
1615–1616. Cossack rebellion.
1617. Cossack rebellion.
1618–1621. Turkey.
1623–1625. Cossacks; who were subdued.
1626–1629. Sweden. Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus.

Wladislaus IV, 1632–1648

1632–1634. Russia; ended by Treaty of Polianovka.
1632–1634. Turkey.
1634. Cossack revolt.
1636. Cossack revolt.

1638. Cossack revolt.
1638. Attack on Dantzig, and destruction of fleet by Danes.
1646–1648. Tatar and Turkish raids in Poland.

John Casimir, 1648–1668

1648–1649. Tatar Khan of Crimea at war with Poland.
1648–1649. Cossack rebellion, headed by Chmelnitski.
1651–1654. Cossack rebellion and secession from Poland.
1654–1656. Russia; ended by Armistice of Vilna.
1655–1660. Sweden; "The Deluge" in Poland; ended by Peace of Oliwa.
1656–1657. Brandenburg; ended by Treaty of Wehlau, freeing Prussia.
1657–1662. Rakoczy, of Transylvania.
1658–1667. Renewal of Russian war; ended by Peace of Andrussowo.
1667–1668. Cossacks and Tatars, headed by Doroshenke.

Michael Wisniowiecki, 1669–1673

1672. Turkey.

John III, Sobieski, 1674–1696

1673–1675. Turkey.
1683–1699. Turkey. Sobieski's Vienna triumph.

Augustus II, 1697–1704

Stanislaus Leszczynski, 1704–1709

1701–1706. Sweden; ended by Peace of Altranstädt.

Augustus II, 1709–1733

1709–1719. Sweden; ended by a truce, which was made permanent.

Augustus III, 1733–1763

1733–1735. War of the Polish Succession against Russia.

Stanislaus II, Poniatowski, 1764–1795

1768–1772. War of the Confederation of Bar, leading to First Partition.
1792. Resistance to Russia and the Second Partition.
1794. Russia; leading to the Third Partition.
1795. Prussia; leading to the Third Partition.

IX

HOHENZOLLERN PRUSSIA

The German Empire from 1871

PRUSSIAN military history may be divided into two parts; first, that of the standing mercenary army developed by Frederick William I and Frederick the Great, which fell into ignominious decrepitude and was defeated at Valmy, Jena, and Auerstadt; and second, that of the nation in arms, an idea which Prussia has led in developing, from Scharnhorst on through William I, Roon and Bismarck, to William II.

The figures for Prussia commence in these statistics in 1618, the year when the electorate of Brandenburg and the duchy of Prussia were united, and what is essentially historic Prussia made her appearance in European politics. After 1871 the German Empire succeeds Prussia. Starting with a very high figure for the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), during most of which the elector, though not at war, could not prevent the utter devastation of his territories by the belligerents, Prussia has lowered her war curve almost steadily until a surprisingly peaceful record

of four per cent was reached, and that in the time of Bismarck.

It is rather a curious fact, and one worth commenting on, that in the seventeenth century, in the days of the mild and weak George William, Prussia should have been visited by a great amount of war, and that during the last two generations, under a notoriously military régime, her war years should have declined to about the lowest of any nation in history. The real lesson to be drawn from this is not that preparedness makes for peace, but rather that history contains many anomalous phenomena. If in a long sequence of instances it should be found that a majority of the wars came to nations relatively unprepared, and that the stronger military powers tended to maintain themselves in states of peace, it would be right to draw the obvious conclusions. It would be possible, if we had a systematic compilation of the wars of a great many nations, to get some light upon this problem. In the mean time we should withhold opinion.

Below are the figures for Prussia showing the decline in war years, given by half-centuries and by centuries.

1600		1700		1800	1900
39	19.5	20	11	7.5	5.5
58.5		31		13	

Prussia, 1618–1871; Germany, 1871–1914

George William, 1619–1640

1625–1653. Parts of the realm occupied by belligerents and by Swedes.
1626–1629. Sweden, in Prussia.
1631–1635. War against the Empire; ended by acceptance of Peace of Prag.
1635–1640. Sweden.

Frederick William, 1640–1688

1651. Neuburg.
1656–1657. Poland; ended by Peace of Wehlau.
1657–1660. Sweden; alliance at Wehlau with Poland and Austria.
1672–1673. France; ended by Peace of Vossem.
1674–1679. France; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.
1675–1679. Sweden; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Fehrbellin.

Frederick I, 1688–1713

1688–1697. France. War of the League of Augsburg.
1701–1713. France and her allies. War of the Spanish Succession.

Frederick William I, 1713–1740

1715–1720. Sweden.

Frederick II, the Great, 1740–1786

1740–1742. Austria. First Silesian War; ended by Peace of Breslau.
1744–1745. Austria. Second Silesian War; ended by Peace of Dresden.
1756–1763. Austria. Third Silesian War. Seven Years' War; ended by Peace of Hubertsburg.
1756–1763. France. Seven Years' War; ended by Peace of Paris.
1757–1762. Russia. Seven Years' War; ended by Peace of Paris.
1757–1762. Sweden. Seven Years' War; ended by Peace of Paris.
1778–1779. Austria. War of the Bavarian Succession; ended by Peace of Teschen.

Frederick William II, 1786–1797

1792–1795. France; ended by Peace of Basel.
1794–1795. Poland; leading to the Third Partition.

Frederick William III, 1797–1840

1806–1807. France; ended by Treaty of Tilsit.
1812. Russia; ended by Convention of Tauroggen.
1812–1814. France; ended by First Treaty of Paris.
1813–1814. Denmark, the ally of France.
1815. France. *Les Cent Jours* and Waterloo.

Frederick William IV, 1840–1861

1846. Part in putting down Cracow insurrection.
1848. Riots in Berlin.
1848–1849. First War of Schleswig-Holstein against Denmark.
1849. Denmark. Second War of Schleswig-Holstein.
1849. Intervention in Baden.

William I, 1861–1888

1864. Denmark; ended by Peace of Vienna.
1866. Austria; ended by Peace of Prag.
1870–1871. France; ended by Peace of Frankfort.

Frederick III, 1888–1888

William II, 1888–

1914– . Russia, France, England, Belgium, Servia, Japan. War of the Alliances.

X

RUSSIA

Russia, whatever may be the reason, has been obliged in the fulfillment of her destiny to engage in an unusual number of wars, many of them covering vast stretches both of time and of area. Her great war epochs came, apparently, by fits and starts at intervals of about a century and a half. The age of Ivan the Great (1462–1505) was one of great struggles, culminating in the final expulsion of the Tatars, in the self-assertion of the autocrat over the great city of Novgorod, and in a new and defiant attitude on the part of Russia in regard to Poland-Lithuania, her western neighbor.

The half-century that followed was Russia's most warlike, with its battling against the Livonian Order of Knights and against Poland, a survival of the old struggle of German and Slav, which again to-day is uppermost. At the same time Tatars raided the land and stirred up rebellion continually in Kazan. Every man's hand was against his neighbor in the last decade of the half-century when Ivan the Terrible was in his minority.

From 83 per cent in the age just referred to, Russia's curve sinks only to 72 per cent in the second half of the cycle, that of the First Great Northern War, when Ivan the Terrible first made Russia a great Baltic power. Then came the "Troublous Times," and all that had been gained was lost for a while, and the tragic faces of Boris Godunov, the First and Second False Dmitri, Marya, and the rest appear and pass on. Russia was in anarchy until 1613, when patriotic risings brought the House of Romanov to the throne. The more peaceful times that followed make the war figure for 1600–1650 a fairly low one. The next raising of the curve comes with the Second Great Northern War, that of "The Deluge," when Russia fought Poland, Sweden, and again Poland. The complications of the Cossack wars and in the last years of the century trouble with Turkey added to the war record. The eighteenth century was one of shorter wars, during which Russia prepared herself for the preponderant rôle which she was to play in the first part of the nineteenth century, when her war curve rose again. Part of the increase was imparted by the Napoleonic conflict, but Russia's eastward expansion brought other complications, and the conquest of the Caucasus, while involving no huge army, was the work of many

years. This was the epoch of Russian penetration into Central Asia.

The very high percentage of war years found in the history of Russia, during her dark and early period, would probably on first thought be ascribed to her then backward state of evolution, but this does not seem to be a justified inference. If England and France in their more archaic periods showed an increase in war activity there would be the pointed suggestion here in regard to Russia. Furthermore, the Russian "war curve" does not decline more than a little for the whole four hundred and fifty years here presented. It was 71 per cent as late as 1800–1850. Also Holland, Spain, and Sweden fought from 75 to 95 per cent of the time during their eras of greatest "civilization." These considerations show the value of the comparative method in historical generalization even if, as in this case, it has a negative value.

Russia's Years of War



RUSSIA, 1450–1914

1450–1453. Civil war with Shemiaka.
1455–1461. Tatars.
1456. Repression of Novgorod.
1458–1459. Suppression of Viatka.
1463. Swedish raid.

Ivan the Great, 1462–1505

1464–1465. Slight war with Pskov.
1465. Tatar inroad.
1466–1467. Raids in Finland against Swedes.
1467–1469. Expedition against Kazan.
1468. Tatars.
1471. Suppression of Novgorod.
1472. Conquest of Permia.
1472. Tatars.
1478. Final suppression of Novgorod.
1480. Tatar invasion. Unsuccessful campaign of Achmet.
1480–1483. Livonian Order.
1485. Conquest of Tver.
1487. Capture of Kazan.
1489. Subjection of Viatka.
1491–1510. Sweden.
1492–1494. Lithuania.
1496–1497. Rebellion in Kazan.
1499–1500. Transural expedition.
1500–1503. Lithuania and the Livonian Order.
1503–1509. War continued with the Livonian Order alone.

Vassili V, 1505–1533

1506. Expedition against Kazan.
1508. Poland-Lithuania.
1511–1526. Poland-Lithuania.
1521. Rebellion in Kazan.
1524. Expedition to Kazan.
1527–1529. Tatar invasions.
1530–1531. Kazan.
1533. Tatar invasions.

Regency, 1533–1547

1534–1537. Poland-Lithuania.
1535. Tatar invasion.
1535. Rebellion of Kazan.
1538–1547. Country overrun by foes on every side, during minority.

Ivan the Terrible, 1547–1584

1547. Expedition against Kazan.
1549–1553. Final war on Kazan.
1554–1555. Conquest of Astrakhan.
1554–1557. Sweden.

1557–1561. Livonian Order.
1559–1561. Sweden.
1561–1570. Livonian Order and Denmark.
1561–1571. Poland.
1569. Tatars.
1571. Tatar raids.
1572–1583. Sweden.
1572. Tatar raids.
1575–1582. Poland; ended by Treaty of Iam Zapolski.
1581–1582. Ermak's expedition to conquer Siberia.

Feodor I, 1584–1598

1590–1595. Sweden.
1591–1594. Tatar khan.
1595. Expedition against Shavkal.
1598. Expedition against Kuchum.

Boris Godunov, 1598–1605

1601–1604. Famine and brigandage.
1604–1605. Invasion of Russia by the First False Dmitri.
1605. Expedition in Daghestan.
1606. Overthrow of the First False Dmitri.

Vassili Shuiski, 1606–1610

1607–1610. War of the Second False Dmitri, the Brigand of Tushino.
1607–1609. Sweden.
1609–1618. Poland.

Interregnum, 1610–1613

1610–1611. Sweden.

Michael Romanov, 1613–1645

1613–1617. Sweden; ended by Peace of Stolbove.
1632–1634. Poland; ended by Treaty of Polianovka.
1633. Tatar inroads.

Regency, 1645–1650

1648. Riot at Moscow.

Alexis, 1650–1676

1654–1656. Poland; ended by Armistice of Vilna.
1656–1658. Sweden; ended by truce of Valiesar. (Peace of Cardis, 1661.)

1658–1659. War against Vygovski and part of the Cossacks.
1658–1667. Poland; ended by Peace of Andrussowo.
1668–1681. The Cossacks of the right bank of the Dnieper.
1669–1671. Revolt of Stenko Razin.

Feodor III, 1676–1682

1677–1681. Tatars; ended by peace between tsar and sultan.

Regency, 1682–1689

1682. Revolt of the Streltsi.
1684. Less important revolt of the Streltsi.
1687–1699. Turkey; the first with Turkey herself.
1689. Fighting with the Chinese in the Amur Valley.

Peter the Great, 1689–1725

1695–1696. Expeditions to Azov.
1698. Last revolt of the Streltsi.
1700–1721. Sweden. Third Great Northern War; ended by Peace of Nystad.
1705. Revolt in Astrakhan.
1711–1712. Turkey; ended by Peace of Pruth.
1720–1721. English fleet in war against Russia.
1722. Persia.

Catherine I, 1725–1727

Regency, 1727–1730

Anne, 1730–1740

1733–1735. Poland and France. War of the Polish Succession.
1725–1739. Turkey; ended by Peace of Belgrade.

Regency, 1740–1741

1741–1743. Sweden; ended by Peace of Abö.

Elizabeth, 1741–1762

1757–1762. Prussia. Seven Years' War.

Catherine II, 1762–1796

1768–1772. War against the Confederation of Bar.
1768–1774. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji.
1773–1774. Pugachev's revolt.
1783–1784. Seizure of the Crimea.

1787–1792. Turkey; ended by Peace of Jassy.
1788–1790. Sweden; ended by Peace of Verelü.
1792. Attack on Poland; leading to Second Partition.
1794. Struggle leading to the Third Partition of Poland.
1795–1796. Persia.

Paul, 1796–1801

1798–1800. France; Russia joining the Second Coalition.
1804–1813. Persia.

Alexander I, 1810–1825

1805–1807. France. The War of the Third Coalition; ended by Peace of Tilsit.
1806–1812. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Bucharest.
1807–1812. England.
1808–1809. Sweden, and the acquisition of Finland. Peace of Friedrichsham.
1809. Austria; a nominal war as ally of France.
1812–1814. France; ended by First Treaty of Paris.
1812. Prussia, the ally of France; ended by Convention of Tauroggen.
1812–1813. Austria.
1813–1814. Denmark, the ally of France.
1815. France.

Nicholas I, 1825–1855

1825. Rising of the Decembrists.
1826–1828. Persia.
1827. Turkey; aid given the Greeks at Navarino.
1828–1829. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Adrianople.
1829–1864. War in the Lesghian Hills against Shamil.
1830–1832. Revolt in Poland.
1839–1842. War in Khiva.
1840–1841. Aid given Prussia and Austria at Cracow, then in revolt.
1849. Aid given Austria in Hungary, and Capitulation of Villagos.
1853–1856. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War.
1854–1856. England; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War.
1854–1856. France; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War.
1855–1856. Sardinia; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War.

Alexander II, 1855–1881

1861. Riots in Poland.
1863. Insurrection in Poland. "Order is restored in Poland."
1865. Conquest of Turkestan.

1868. Conquest of Bokhra.
1873. Conquest of Khiva.
1876. Conquest of Khocand.
1877–1878. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Berlin.
1881. Subjection of the last Turkoman tribes.

Alexander III, 1881–1894

Nicholas II, 1894–

1900. Participation in suppression of Boxer rebellion.
1904–1905. Japan; ended by Treaty of Portsmouth.
1914– . Germany, Austria, and Turkey.

XI

SPAIN

THE war curve for Spain shows very high percentages, especially from 1450 to 1700; 76, 55, 91, 96, 68 are percentages exceeded nowhere in this research, except in the same period in the history of Turkey. While it is true that the second half of her history is more peaceful than the first, the whole distribution of dates cannot be considered very encouraging to those who hope for universal peace. The lowest percentage, 28, occurs 1750–1800, while the nineteenth century averages more than 50 per cent of war. In a general way it may be said that Spain fought more in the era when she was great than in the days of her degeneracy. Her entire history may be divided into three periods. In the first, 1450–1600, she was strong, fighting 74 per cent of the time. In the second, 1600–1750, she disintegrated, fighting 74.3 per cent of the time. In the third, she remained weak, fighting 45 per cent of the time. The great harmfulness of the third period was that her wars were fought to no purpose and were to a great extent internal disturbances. The great

trouble with the wars of the middle period was that she lost them.

Below are the years of war during each half-century and century.

1500		1600		1700		1800		1900
38	27.5	45.5	48	34	29.5	19	30	23.5
	73		82		48.5		53.5	

Spain, 1479–1914

Ferdinand and Isabella, 1479–1504

1476–1492. The Moors of Spain.
1479. Portugal.
1480. Moroccan expedition.
1487. Moroccan expedition.
1490. Moroccan expedition.
1495–1497. France, in Italy.
1497. Moroccan expedition.
1501. Revolt of the Moriscos.
1501. Revolt in Naples, Spain aiding the French.
1502–1504. France, in Italy.

Ferdinand, Regent, 1504–1516

1508–1510. Venice. War of the League of Cambrai.
1509–1510. African conquests of Cisneros.
1511–1513. France. War of the "Holy League."

Charles V, 1517–1566

1519–1521. Conquest of Mexico by Hernando Cortez.
1520–1521. Revolt of the Communides.
1521–1526. First war against Francis I, of France; ended by Treaty of Madrid.
1521–1527. The Pope and Venice; the sack of Rome.
1526–1529. Second war against Francis I; ended by Peace of Cambrai.
1531–1535. Conquest of Peru by Francisco Pizarro.
1535. Expedition against Tunis.
1536–1538. Third war against Francis I; ended by Peace of Nice.
1536–1541. Civil war in Peru.
1541. Expedition against Algiers.

1542–1544. Fourth war against Francis I; ended by Peace of Crépy.
1552–1559. France; ended by Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis.
1559–1564. Turkey.

Philip II, 1566–1598

1566–1567. Revolt of the Dutch "Beggars."
1568–1609. War of the Dutch Independence.
1569–1580. Turkey. Campaign of Lepanto.
1569–1571. Revolt of the Moriscos in Spain.
1579–1582. War against Don Antonio in Portugal.
1585–1604. England. Campaign of the Armada.
1589–1598. France. Spain the ally of the Catholic League.
1591. Revolt in Zaragossa.

Philip III, 1598–1621

1604. Expedition against the Turks.
1610–1614. Turkey.
1615–1617. Savoy.
1617–1621. Venice.
1618–1619. Turkey.

Philip IV, 1621–1665

1620–1648. Participation in the Thirty Years' War.
1621–1648. Resumption of war with Holland.
1625–1630. England.
1629–1631. France. War of the Mantuan Succession.
1631. Rebellion in Vizcaya.
1635–1659. France; ended by the Peace of the Pyrenees.
1637. Riots in Portugal.
1639–1659. Separatist war in Catalonia.
1640–1668. War of Portuguese Independence.
1641. Revolt in Andalusia.
1646–1647. Revolts in Sicily.
1647–1648. Revolts in Naples.
1654–1659. England.

Regency, 1665–1679

1666–1667. Barbary States.
1667–1668. France. War of Devolution.
1672–1678. France; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen.
1672–1673. Barbary States.

Charles II, 1679–1700

1681. Barbary States.
1683–1684. France.
1688–1697. France. War of the League of Augsburg.
1688–1689. Barbary States.
1693–1694. Barbary States.

Philip V, 1700–1745

1701–1713. Ally of France against Austria, England, Holland, etc.
1705–1715. Rebellion in Catalonia.
1717. Seizure of Sardinia.
1718–1720. England, France, Austria, Holland. War of the Quadruple Alliance.
1727–1729. England.
1733–1735. Austria. War of the Polish Succession.
1739–1748. England. War of Jenkins's Ear.
1740–1748. Ally of France in the War of the Austrian Succession.

Ferdinand VI, 1745–1759

Charles III, 1759–1788

1762–1763. England and Portugal.
1766. Riots in Madrid.
1770. Trouble with England in the Falkland Islands.
1775. Moroccan War.

Charles IV, 1788–1808

1779–1783. England; ended by Treaty of Versailles.
1783–1784. War on Argel.
1793–1795. France; ended by Treaty of Basel.
1796–1802. England, Spain the ally of France.
1801. War with Portugal.
1804–1808. England, Spain the ally of France.

Joseph Bonaparte, 1808

1808–1814. Revolt of the Spanish people against the French.

Ferdinand VII, 1814–1833

1808–1823. Revolt and Separation of Spain's American colonies.
1816–1819. Revolts against Ferdinand VII.
1820. Revolt of Del Riego, etc.
1821–1823. Revolts against king, leading to French intervention.
1830. Liberal revolt.

Isabella II, 1833–1868

1833–1840. Revolt of Don Carlos.
1841. Riots.
1844. Revolts in Cuba and Manila.
1846. Revolts in Spain.
1847. Carlist War.
1851. Cuban revolt.
1854. Risings in Spain.
1859–1860. Morocco.
1861–1862. Participation in Mexican expedition of Maximilian.
1866. Liberal revolt.
1868. September Revolution under Prim's leadership.

Provisional Government and Regency, 1868–1869

1868–1878. Cuban revolt.
1869. Spain in anarchy.

Amadeo, 1870–1873

1872–1885. Third Carlist War.

Republic, 1873–1875

1873–1875. Spain in anarchy.

Alphonso XII, 1875–1885

Regency, 1885–1902

1895–1898. Cuban Revolution.
1898. The United States; ended by Peace of Paris.

XII

SWEDEN

The curve for Sweden forms the outline of two apexes, one considerably higher than the other. The first of the two reaches 79 per cent in the half-century, 1600–1650. This was the era of the Thirty Years' War of Charles IX, Gustavus Adolphus and Oxenstierna, of constant wars in Germany and Livonia, Denmark or Russia. It was the epoch of the Swedish Empire, if so it may be termed. This period of great wars went on for a decade after the middle of the century. The Second Great Northern War found Charles X (1654–1660) at the head of an army which for fighting ability, endurance, and general command could not be matched in Europe, unless Cromwell's Ironsides had been set beside them. Swedish infantry had replaced Spanish infantry as the expression of highest efficiency.

The Swedish Empire was of short duration, however, and at Fehrbellin in 1675 the Great Elector of Brandenburg dealt it a telling blow. This half-century (1650–1700) was one of only 21 per cent of war. It was followed by the lesser apex, the Third Great Northern

War, when that mad genius, Charles XII, marched over all the countries of the North to find himself in the end a beaten fugitive at Bender, where Turkish hospitality afforded a poor consolation. With the termination of this last Great Northern War in 1721, Sweden ceased to rank as a great power and her battles became less frequent. Her part in the Seven Years' War was at no time impressive. A few disastrous, and important, wars with Russia, when Sweden lost Finland, and her participation in the Napoleonic struggles, were the only serious contests in the last two centuries.

When Sweden was a great power, she fought her maximum years of war. She has not been a fighter since. In this respect Sweden resembles Holland, and both differ from Spain, where civil war took the place of the grand wars of the earlier centuries. Sweden, like Holland and Denmark, has shown herself fairly well capacitated for self-government and the maintenance of continued peace. Her civil wars have not been unusually frequent. Her early wars against Denmark, in the period 1453–1500, though almost civil wars, — since it was a continually recurring question at this time whether the two Northern kingdoms should or should not remain under the same joint ruler, — were not

sufficiently numerous to raise the average to more than 43 per cent. It was only her entrance into a career of conquest and her challenge of great European kingdoms and of the Empire that raised her war percentage to 77, an amount so frequently seen for other nations when exercising political importance.

The war years for Sweden are here given by half-centuries and by centuries.

1500		1600		1700		1800		1900
21.5	21.5	29	39.5	10.5	22.5	7	6.5	0.0
	50.5		50		29.5		6.5	

Sweden, 1450–1914

Confused and disputed rule, 1446–1523

1451–1457. War in Sweden against Christian I, of Denmark.
1463–1465. Denmark, in Scania.
1467–1471. Second war against Christian I, of Denmark. Battle of Brunkeberg.
1491–1510. Russia.
1496–1497. War between John, of Sweden, and Steno Sture, administrator.
1501–1513. Denmark. War waged by the Sture family largely.
1516–1520. Denmark conquered Sweden. Massacre at Stockholm.
1521–1524. War of Liberation, led by Gustavus Vasa; ended by Peace of Malmoë.

Gustavus Vasa, 1523–1560

1534–1536. Lübeck.
1554–1557. Russia; ended by Peace of Moscow.
1559–1561. Russia, Sweden the ally of the Livonian Order.

Eric XIV, 1560–1568

1563–1570. Denmark; ended by Peace of Stettin.

John III, 1568–1592

1572–1583. Russia, in Baltic Provinces; ended by a prolonged truce.

Sigismund, 1592–1595

1590–1595. Russia; ended by Peace of Tensin.

Sigismund and Charles, 1595–1600

1598. War against King Sigismund; ended by Convention at Linkoping.

Charles IX, 1600–1611

1600–1611. Denmark; ended by a truce. War of Kalmar.
1600–1609. Poland.
1607–1609. Russian expedition to aid Basil Shuiski, etc.
1609–1611. Russia; against no organized government.

Gustavus Adolphus, 1611–1632

1613–1617. Russia; against Tsar Michael; ended by Peace of Stolbowo.
1616–1618. Denmark; ended by a truce.
1620–1622. Denmark; ended by a truce.
1625–1626. Denmark; ended by a truce.
1626–1628. Denmark; ended by a truce.
1626–1629. War with the Elector-Duke in Prussia.
1628–1629. Denmark. War of Kalmar; ended by Truce of Altmark.

Regency, 1632–1644

1630–1648. The Empire and its allies. Thirty Years' War.

Christina, 1644–1654

1643–1645. Denmark; ended by Peace of Bromsebrö.

Charles X, 1654–1660

1655–1660. Poland, Charles X claiming Polish throne; ended by Peace of Oliwa.
1656–1658. Russia; ended by three-year truce. (Peace of Cardis, 1661.)
1657–1658. Denmark; ended by Peace of Roskilde.
1657–1660. Brandenburg-Prussia; ended by Peace of Oliwa.
1657–1660. The Empire; ended by Peace of Oliwa.
1658–1660. Denmark; ended by Treaty of Copenhagen.

Regency, 1660–1672

1665–1666. Bremen; ended by Treaty of Habenhausen.

Charles XI, 1672–1697

1675–1679. Brandenburg-Prussia, Lunenburg, and Munster.
1675–1679. The Empire; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen.
1675–1679. Denmark; ended by Peace of Lund.
1675–1679. Holland; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen.

Charles XII, 1697–1718

1699–1700. Denmark; ended by Peace of Travendal.
1700–1721. Russia; ended by Peace of Nystadt.
1700–1706. Saxony; ended by Treaty of Alt-Ranstädt. (Poland also.)
1709–1719. Saxony and Poland; ended by a truce which was made permanent.
1709–1720. Denmark.
1715–1719. Naval action of England against Sweden.
1715–1720. Prussia.

Ulrica Eleanor, 1719–1720

1719–1720. Hanover.

Frederick I, 1720–1751

1741–1743. Russia; ended by Peace of Abö.

Adolphus Frederick, 1751–1771

1757–1762. Prussia; ended by Truce of Hamburg.

Gustavus III, 1771–1792

1788–1790. Russia; ended by Peace of Verelü.
1788. Denmark, the ally of Russia.

Gustavus IV, 1792–1809

1805–1810. France; ended by Peace of Paris. War of the Third Coalition.
1808–1809. Russia; ended by Peace of Friedrichsham.
1808–1809. Denmark, the ally of Russia.

Charles XIII, 1809–1819

1813–1814. Denmark, Sweden in alliance with powers. Peace of Kiel.
1813–1814. France, Sweden in alliance with powers.
1815. France.

XIII

TURKEY

Years of War



The figures given in the tables for Turkey include only her European possessions; the Asiatic wars are excluded for lack of accurate data, and because, after all, they concern Europe in no such way as do the extra-European operations of England or Russia. Excluded, too, are the dynastic upheavals and the personal rivalries for the throne, most of them, to be sure, very short and decisive. Like Spain, and during the same century, 1550–1650, Turkey fought nearly all the time. Indeed, her war figures for 1450–1700 afford the highest percentage of war for so long a period shown by any country. Turkey's wars were fought against the Empire, and in Hungary to a large extent. Her other great foes were Spain, the victor at Lepanto in 1571, and doughty little Venice, who, though unsupported, dared meet the "unspeakable Turk." What a bulwark Venice was against him! Like Poland, she sacrificed much of her

own future in intercepting from Western Europe the blows of the less civilized Asiatic.

Since the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, Turkey has ceased to be a formidable foe and her number of wars has declined decidedly. The first half of the nineteenth century was more warlike than the preceding because of countless risings in the Balkans, and the aggressive policy of Russia; still the percentage does not rise to fifty. The one fact that stands out most prominently in the history of Turkish wars is the abrupt falling-off after the year 1700. Since 1900, Turkey has been involved in three wars, including the present one. The first, against Italy, and the second, the Balkan War, both short but very disastrous to the Ottoman Empire.

TURKEY, 1450–1914

Murad II, 1421–1451

1450–1453. Greek Empire; ended by the capture of Constantinople.
1450–1454. Venice.

Mahommed II, 1451–1481

1451–1461. War with Scanderbeg, of Albania.
1454–1458. Invasion of Serbia.
1454–1456. Huniadi.
1458–1462. Greek War.
1462–1464. Conquest of Wallachia and Bosnia.
1463–1464. Huniadi in Hungary.
1463–1479. Venice.
1464–1467. Scanderbeg.
1469–1480. The Empire.
1474. Repulse in Albania.
1475. Repulse in Moldavia.

1480–1481. Attack on Apulia.
1480. Attack on Rhodes.

Bayezed II, 1481–1512

1482–1483. Hungarian aggressions.
1486–1489. Poland.
1490–1495. Hungary.
1497. Poland.
1498–1503. Venice.
1499–1502. Hungarian War.

Selim I, 1512–1520

1512–1519. Hungary.

Suleiman I, 1520–1566

1521–1531. The Empire.
1522. Conquest of Rhodes.
1532–1534. The Empire.
1535. Spain and the Empire.
1536–1540. Venice.
1537–1547. The Empire.
1538–1547. The Pope.
1541. Spain. Algerian expedition of Charles V.
1551–1562. The Empire and Hungary.
1559–1564. Spain.

Selim II, 1566–1574

1565–1568. The Empire.
1569–1580. Spain. Campaign of Lepanto.
1570–1573. Venice and the Pope.

Murad III, 1574–1595

1575–1593. Partisan warfare in Hungary.
1583–1590. Poland.
1593–1606. Active, or nominal, war with the Empire and Hungary.

Mahommed III, 1595–1603

1596–1606. Rising of the Balkans.

Ahmed I, 1603–1617

1604. Spanish expedition against Turks.
1607–1609. Irruptions of Cossacks on Black Sea.

1607–1624. Turkey involved in the Moldavian War.
1610–1614. Spain.
1616–1617. Sea raids of Jean Pierre.

Osman II, 1618–1622

1618–1619. Spain.
1618–1621. Poland.

Mustafa I, 1622–1623

Murad IV, 1623–1640

1625–1626. Cossack raids in Black Sea region.
1627. Cossack raids in Black Sea region.
1627–1645. State of war in Moldavia.
1628. Cossack raids in Black Sea region.
1632–1634. Poland.
1637. Cossacks again in Black Sea region.

Ibrahim, 1640–1648

1645–1669. Venice.
1646–1648. Tatar and Turkish raids in Poland.

Regency, 1648–1663

1657–1662. Hungary; against Rákoczy and the foes of Poland.
1661–1664. The Empire. Campaign of St. Gothard.

Mahommed IV, 1663–1687

1663–1664. France, the ally of the Emperor at St. Gothard.
1672. Poland.
1673–1675. Poland.
1677–1681. Russian Cossacks; ended by a peace with the tsar himself.
1682–1699. Austria; ended by Peace of Carlowitz.
1683–1699. The Empire; ended by Peace of Carlowitz.
1683–1699. Poland; ended by Peace of Carlowitz.
1683–1699. Venice; ended by Peace of Carlowitz.

Suleiman II, 1687–1691

Ahmed II, 1691–1695

1687–1699. Russia.

Mustafa II, 1695–1703

Ahmed III, 1703–1730

1711–1712. Russia; ended by Peace of Pruth.
1714–1718. Venice; ended by Peace of Passarowitz.

Mahmud I, 1730–1754

1716–1718. Austria.
1735–1739. Russia; ended by Peace of Belgrade.
1737–1739. Austria; ended by Peace of Belgrade.

Osman III, 1754–1757

Mustafa III, 1757–1773

1768–1774. Russia; ended by Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji.
1770. Revolt of Greeks.

Abd-ul-Hamid, 1773–1789

1783–1784. Loss of the Crimea.
1787–1792. Russia; ended by Treaty of Jassy.
1787–1791. Austria.

Selim III, 1789–1807

1798–1801. France. Bonaparte's Syrian campaign.
1802–1803. Revolt of the Suliots.
1804–1812. Serbian rebellion.
1806–1812. Russia; ended by Peace of Bucharest.

Mustafa IV, 1807–1808

1807. English attack on Constantinople.

Mahmud II, 1808–1839

1815. Serbian rebellion.
1816. English attack on Algiers.
1820–1822. Revolt of Ali Pasha in Epirus.
1821–1829. War of Greeks for their independence from Turkey.
1827. Interference of powers in aid of Greeks at Navarino.
1828–1829. Russia; ended by Peace of Adrianople.
1830. Insurrection in the Balkans.
1831–1833. Revolt of Mehemet Ali.

Abd-ul-Mejid, 1839–1861

1839–1841. Second revolt of Mehemet Ali.
1852–1853. Montenegro.
1853–1856. Russia; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War.
1858. Second war with Montenegro.

Abd-ul-Aziz, 1861–1876

1861–1862. Third war with Montenegro.
1862. Bombardment of Belgrade.
1866–1869. Revolt of Crete.
1875–1876. Revolt of the Herzegovina.
1875–1876. Massacres in Bulgaria.

Abd-ul-Hamid II, 1876–1909

1876–1877. War in Serbia and Montenegro.
1877–1878. Russia; ended by Peace of Berlin
1894–1896. Armenian Massacres.
1896–1898. Revolt of Crete.
1897. Greek War; ended by Treaty of Constantinople.

Mahommed V, 1909–

1911. Italy.
1912. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece.
1914– . Russia, England, France, Serbia, and allies.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

CHART A

The reader will observe that on Chart A the countries are arranged so that each is next to those with which it has been most at war. In this way we are able to see at a glance the Russo-Swedish War of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the two wars of Turkey and Austria, in the first half of the sixteenth century, and the two in the second half. The War for Dutch Independence is clean-cut in the columns of Holland and Spain, while England's share in the struggle is manifest. Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark exhibit the First Great Northern War of the second half of the sixteenth century. Glancing to the right, one sees the black patch of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), in which the Second Great Northern War is merged; then the double streak of the War of the League of Augsburg in the West and the conflict in the East which led to the Peace of Carlowitz in 1669. After that comes the black strip that marks the War of the Spanish Succession, the Third Great Northern War, and the Turkish war that ended at Passarowitz in 1718.

There was no break in the continuity of black from 1450 to 1721. During this period of two hundred and seventy-one years there was no year in which at least one of the eleven nations, whose wars are here tabulated, was not fighting. Four short spaces of time present themselves in which all of the countries were at war, when an unbroken line of black is to be seen from top to bottom of the figure. These little stretches,

however, possess no significance of their own indicating any particular series of events. With the Treaty of Nystadt, between Russia and Sweden in 1721, the Temple of Janus was closed for the first time in modern history. From this time on constant breaks occur in the chart's columns of black. After 1721 the first striking period of warfare is that of the Austrian Succession; next that of the Seven Years' War, and a half-century later, the chart shows in heavy black the Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts. From Waterloo, a century ago, to the summer of 1914, no war has enveloped Europe as a whole; they have been fewer and of duration so comparatively short that, on a chart such as this, they present a slight appearance.

CHARTS B, C, AND D

Has the decrease in number of years of war been as great proportionally for what are to-day the great powers of Europe as it has been for what are to-day the impotent or decadent states of Europe? A scrutiny of Chart D, where are compared the average curves of the five strong powers of to-day and five weak nations of to-day, together with the average curve of all, shows that the lesser nations saw a more complete decline in war than the greater. The general proportion of the figure of Chart C (that of the lesser nations) is of a slope from left to right, while that of Chart B (that of the greater nations) is much more nearly horizontal.

Prussia has had a great decrease; so has Austria; but England, France, and Russia show a far less decided downward curve. On the other hand, Turkey ceased to fight many great wars. Denmark, Sweden and Holland either ceased fighting altogether, or dropped from the ranks of belligerents to all practical intents.

The great powers are not the powers that have lost


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AUSTRIA
PRUSSIA
RUSSIA
ENGLAND
FRANCE
GROUP A
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1550-1600
1600-1650


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Chart B
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1800-1850
1850-1900


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HOLLAND
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SWEDEN
DENMARK
GROUP B


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Chart C
SPAIN
TURKEY
POLAND
1700 - 1750
1750 - 1800
1800 - 1850
1850 - 1900


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GROUP B
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
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Chart D
GROUP A
TOTAL AVERAGE
GROUP B

the military taste; the small states are the homes of peaceful policy. This may not be a sure historical generalization, but it is at least a suggestion that cannot be avoided.

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